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(IN)VALID  PATENTS
Paul R. Gugliuzza*
ABSTRACT
Increasingly, accused infringers challenge a patent’s validity in two different forums: in
litigation in federal court and in post-issuance review at the Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO).  These parallel proceedings have produced conflicting and controversial results.  For
example, in one recent case, a district court rejected a challenge to a patent’s validity and
awarded millions of dollars in damages for infringement.  The Federal Circuit initially affirmed
those rulings, ending the litigation over the patent’s validity.  In a subsequent appeal about
royalties owed by the infringer, however, the Federal Circuit vacated the entire judgment—includ-
ing the validity ruling and damages award it had previously affirmed—because the PTO had
since decided that the patent was invalid.  The Federal Circuit reasoned that only “final” court
judgments are immune from the effects of PTO review and, because of the open issue about
royalties, no final judgment existed when the PTO rendered its conflicting decision on patent
validity.
The Federal Circuit’s stringent conception of finality, which this Article terms the “absolute
finality rule,” raises serious questions of judicial economy, fairness, and separation of powers.
Among other things, it allows accused infringers multiple opportunities to defeat liability, permits
an administrative agency to effectively nullify decisions of Article III courts, and incentivizes
courts to abstain from hearing patent cases altogether, at least until the PTO reconsiders the
patent’s validity.  That said, some inefficiency or unfairness is inevitable when two different
government bodies can evaluate the validity of the same patent, and the absolute finality rule, if
nothing else, provides a relatively bright-line test.  But it is not the only way to mediate disagree-
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ments between the courts and the PTO.  This Article, in addition to identifying, describing, and
critiquing the absolute finality rule, explores several other options for providing greater certainty
about patent validity.
INTRODUCTION
In 1935, the physicist Erwin Schro¨dinger illustrated a paradox in quan-
tum theory with a thought experiment.1  Imagine, Schro¨dinger suggested, a
closed box containing radioactive material, poison in a glass bottle, and a live
cat.  If an atom of the radioactive material decays while the cat is in the box, a
mechanism breaks the bottle, releasing the poison and killing the cat.  In our
everyday world, the cat, while in the box, exists in one of two states: it is either
alive or dead, depending on whether or not atomic decay has occurred.
According to quantum theory, however, one cannot know for certain
whether decay has occurred without observing it.  Thus, until the box is
opened, the cat seems to exist in an indeterminate state, both alive and dead.
Yet, in reality, it must be one or the other.
Like Schro¨dinger’s cat, some U.S. patents seem to exist in an indetermi-
nate state because of conflicting decisions about their validity.  The PTO may
issue a patent only if, in its view, the patent satisfies the requirements of the
federal Patent Act.2  In a subsequent lawsuit involving that patent, however, a
court can declare the patent to be invalid, which happens in nearly half of all
patent cases litigated to a final judgment on the issue of validity.3  When a
court finds a patent to be invalid, there is no indeterminacy about the pat-
ent’s legal status.  The Supreme Court has held that a court ruling of invalid-
ity precludes the patent holder from ever again enforcing the patent.4
Litigation, however, is not the only way the validity of an issued patent
can be reviewed.  The PTO offers several proceedings through which an
accused infringer can ask the agency to reconsider a patent’s validity.  These
post-issuance proceedings have become very popular in the past few years,
due largely to the America Invents Act (AIA), which Congress passed in
1 See Erwin Schro¨dinger, Die gegenwa¨rtige Situation in der Quantenmechanik, 23 DIE
NATURWISSENSCHAFTEN 807 (1935), translated in John D. Trimmer, The Present Situation in
Quantum Mechanics: A Translation of Schro¨dinger’s “Cat Paradox”, 124 PROCEEDINGS AM. PHIL.
SOC’Y 323 (1980).
2 In recent years, many scholars have questioned whether the PTO has adequately
enforced those requirements. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAIL-
URE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 161–63 (2008);
Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Grant
Too Many Bad Patents?: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 613, 615–17
(2015).
3 John R. Allison et al., Our Divided Patent System, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073, 1100 (2015)
(reporting an invalidity rate of 42.6% in cases filed in 2008 and 2009).  On the indetermi-
nate nature of patent rights, see generally Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic
Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 75 (2005) (“[A] patent does not confer upon its owner the
right to exclude but rather a right to try to exclude by asserting the patent in court.”).
4 Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971).
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2011.5  Consequently, in several recent cases, a court has ruled in the patent
holder’s favor on the issue of validity, found the patent to be infringed, and
awarded damages, but the PTO, in a concurrent proceeding, ruled that the
patent was invalid.  Like Schro¨dinger’s cat, which seemed to be both alive
and dead, these patents appear to be both valid (according to the court) and
invalid (according to the PTO).
Resolving the legal status of these patents is critically important.  Most
patents in post-issuance review at the PTO are also involved in litigation
between the same parties.6  Courts often stay litigation pending PTO review,
but a stay is not automatic.7  And the PTO is not allowed to stay its proceed-
ings—it must move forward with post-issuance review regardless of any pend-
ing litigation.8
Parallel proceedings and conflicting decisions are therefore increasingly
common.9  Indeed, even the Supreme Court, in a recent case involving one
of the new proceedings created by the AIA, “recognize[d] . . . . that the possi-
bility of inconsistent results is inherent to Congress’ regulatory design.”10
Before 2013, however, there were precisely zero precedential appellate opin-
ions considering how the PTO’s invalidation of a patent affects concurrent
infringement litigation.  But in the past three years, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which has exclusive jurisdiction over patent
appeals,11 has decided several cases presenting that issue.  In two decisions,
the Federal Circuit nullified district court awards of infringement damages to
patent holders because the PTO invalidated the patent before the court pro-
ceedings concluded.12  In both cases, however, the issues of patent validity
5 America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
6 Brian J. Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review: An Early Look at the Numbers, 81
U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 93, 103 (2014) (reporting that eighty percent of patents involved
in inter partes review, the most popular new proceeding created by the America Invents
Act, were also involved in litigation); Saurabh Vishnubhakat et al., Strategic Decision Making
in Dual PTAB and District Court Proceedings, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45, 69 (2016) (reporting
that 86.8% of patents involved in inter partes review and covered business method review,
another new proceeding, were also involved in litigation).
7 Success Rates for Motions to Stay Pending Reexamination, DOCKET NAVIGATOR (2016),
https://www.docketnavigator.com/stats/reexam (reporting that motions to stay litigation
are granted roughly sixty percent of the time).
8 Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1426–27 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
9 See PETER S. MENELL ET AL., PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL GUIDE 2–53 (3d ed.
2016).
10 Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2146 (2016).
11 See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1461
& n.130 (2012) (describing the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction and noting the rare
patent disputes falling outside that jurisdiction).
12 ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 789 F.3d 1349, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Fresenius
USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2013).  As discussed in more
detail below, the monetary award in ePlus was actually a contempt sanction for the
infringer’s violation of a permanent injunction against infringement, but, in the cases dis-
cussed in this Article, the Federal Circuit has treated contempt sanctions and damages for
infringement synonymously. See infra Section II.B.
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and infringement had been fully litigated in court and resolved in the patent
holder’s favor; at the time the PTO invalidated the patent, the only issues
that remained in the court cases related to the patent holders’ remedies,
such as determining the precise scope of an injunction.  The Federal Circuit
ruled, in essence, that court proceedings must be absolutely final for the
court’s ruling to survive the PTO’s invalidation of the asserted patent.
On first glance, this absolute finality rule seems problematic.  As a doctri-
nal matter, it is inconsistent with the flexible and pragmatic definition of
finality found in the law of issue preclusion, which generally considers a deci-
sion on liability to be entitled to preclusive effect even if the court has not yet
determined the remedy.  As a structural matter, the absolute finality rule
raises separation of powers concerns because it allows the PTO to override
decisions of Article III courts.  As a practical matter, it deters settlement and
encourages losing parties to prolong litigation while seeking a favorable deci-
sion from the PTO.  And, by giving an accused infringer two chances to
defeat liability, the absolute finality rule is inconsistent with the notion, well-
established in the Supreme Court’s caselaw on preclusion, that a party should
receive one “full and fair opportunity” to litigate its claims.13
Yet the absolute finality rule has some redeeming qualities.  For exam-
ple, by giving precedence to the PTO’s decision, the rule permits a suppos-
edly expert agency, rather than a court, to make the final decision on patent
validity.  Moreover, the rule helps protect accused infringers from paying
damages for infringing a patent the PTO has determined it never should
have issued.14  The Federal Circuit, however, undermined the potential ben-
efits of the absolute finality rule in another recent decision.  In that case, the
Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s refusal to vacate a judgment award-
ing nearly $400 million in infringement damages even though the PTO had
determined—in a ruling the Federal Circuit later affirmed—that the
infringed patent was invalid.15  The Federal Circuit did not offer any reason-
ing in its opinion, but the rationale seems to be that the courts had resolved
all issues of liability and damages—and a final judgment had been entered—
before the Federal Circuit reviewed the PTO’s invalidity ruling.
To be sure, it is not an easy task for the Federal Circuit to balance the
authority of two different government bodies that possess independent
power to invalidate the same patent.  Yet the Federal Circuit has not even
acknowledged the numerous difficult questions raised by inconsistent court
and PTO decisions in concurrent proceedings, instead claiming that binding
13 See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 332–33 (1979).
14 As explained below, separation of powers doctrine likely prohibits a PTO decision
from serving as the basis for reopening a litigation-ending court judgment awarding dam-
ages. See infra Section III.A (discussing Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211
(1995)).  But, if the PTO proceedings conclude before the district court proceedings, the
absolute finality rule will relieve the defendant from paying damages.
15 Versata Comput. Indus. Sols., Inc. v. SAP AG, 564 F. App’x 600, 601 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(per curiam); see also Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1336 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (affirming the PTO’s decision of invalidity).
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precedent mandates the absolute finality rule.  The cases on which the Fed-
eral Circuit has relied, however, do not squarely address the matter at
hand.16  For example, the Federal Circuit has analogized to cases holding
that one court’s decision of patent invalidity requires dismissal of a claim for
infringement of the same patent that is pending in another court.17  But
those cases involve the doctrine of issue preclusion as between two courts;
they do not answer the question of how a PTO decision of invalidity affects
court proceedings.  Although the Supreme Court has recognized that agency
decisions can be preclusive in later court proceedings,18 a key element of
issue preclusion is not satisfied in parallel court and PTO proceedings on
patent validity because the two bodies use different legal standards to resolve
the dispute.  Most significantly, in court, the accused infringer bears the bur-
den of proving invalidity by clear and convincing evidence,19 but at the PTO
the standard of proof is merely a preponderance of the evidence.20
This Article critiques the Federal Circuit’s absolute finality rule from a
doctrinal perspective and engages the normative questions the Federal Cir-
cuit has ignored.  In so doing, the Article contributes to a nascent literature
exploring the interplay between district court litigation and the increasingly
popular post-issuance review mechanisms at the PTO.21  Doctrinally, the Fed-
eral Circuit should resolve conflicts between the courts and the PTO by look-
ing to law of the case principles.  Unlike the precedent on which the court
has relied, law of the case addresses the precise question of whether an inter-
vening event, such as the PTO’s invalidation of a patent, warrants altering a
prior court ruling in the same case.22  Law of the case is a discretionary, com-
mon law doctrine that counsels the court to follow its prior decision on a
particular issue in all subsequent proceedings in the same case unless, among
other things, the decision was clearly erroneous and continued adherence
would be a manifest injustice.23  If the Federal Circuit viewed conflicts
between the courts and the PTO under this flexible standard, instead of the
16 See infra subsection III.B.1.
17 See, e.g., Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1342–43 (citing Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 26
F.3d 1573, 1576–77 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
18 See B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1299 (2015).
19 Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 95 (2011).
20 Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see also 18 CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4422 (2d ed.), Westlaw (database
updated Apr. 2016) (“Issue preclusion . . . may be defeated . . . by changes in the degree of
persuasion required.”).
21 See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Giving the Federal Circuit a Run for Its Money: Chal-
lenging Patents in the PTAB, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235 (2015); Jacob S. Sherkow, Adminis-
trating Patent Litigation, 90 WASH. L. REV. 205 (2015); Vishnubhakat et al., supra note 6; see
also Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Administrative Power in the Era of Patent Stare
Decisis, 65 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1565 (2016) (exploring the PTO’s assertions of administrative
power under the America Invents Act and considering the PTO’s competition with the
Federal Circuit and district courts for “preeminence in patent law”).
22 See ROBERT C. CASAD & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, RES JUDICATA: A HANDBOOK ON ITS
THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 16–17 (2001); see also infra subsection III.B.3.
23 Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 498 F.3d 1307, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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rigid absolute finality rule, the court would be forced to engage the underly-
ing concerns about judicial economy, fairness, and constitutional structure it
has thus far avoided.
An analysis of those concerns cuts both ways.  On one hand, it seems
unfair and inefficient to give someone a court has held to be a patent
infringer a second chance to avoid liability, as is possible under the absolute
finality rule.  Moreover, the absolute finality rule is in tension with Supreme
Court caselaw on separation of powers, which forbids administrative agencies
from altering definitive court decisions.24  On the other hand, it seems
wrong to allow a patent holder to collect damages for the infringement of a
now-invalidated patent.  Indeed, those who think that the PTO does a poor
job examining patents25 likely have no problem with allowing patent chal-
lengers two chances to invalidate a single patent.
Even under a flexible, policy-sensitive law of the case analysis, then, there
may be no perfect solution to the problem of inconsistent court and PTO
rulings on patent validity.26  And the absolute finality rule, despite its flaws,
provides a relatively clear, bright-line test.  It also incentivizes district courts
to stay litigation pending PTO review to avoid having their work negated by a
PTO decision of invalidity.27  Judicious use of the discretionary power to stay
litigation may, in fact, be the most effective way under existing law for courts
to avoid conflicts with the PTO.  The courts should stay litigation when dupli-
cative proceedings would likely be inefficient, but deny stays when an accused
infringer is merely seeking a second chance at avoiding liability.
Of course, that principle is easier to state than it is for district courts to
consistently apply.  And staying litigation is not the only option for mediating
conflicting decisions on patent validity.  This Article evaluates several possible
legislative reforms, including requiring patent validity challenges to take
place exclusively at the PTO and repealing the statutory presumption of pat-
ent validity, which is the reason the courts and the PTO apply different stan-
dards of proof.28  Ultimately, the problem of conflicting court and PTO
decisions—although serious when it occurs—may be too episodic to justify
such dramatic changes to the patent system.  The aim of reducing conflicting
decisions does, however, lend support to more modest and otherwise sensible
legislative reforms, such as requiring district courts to stay litigation pending
24 See Chi. & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113–14 (1948); see also
infra Section III.A.
25 E.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR
BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO
ABOUT IT 11–13 (2004).
26 Cf. Stuart Minor Benjamin, Stepping into the Same River Twice: Rapidly Changing Facts
and the Appellate Process, 78 TEX. L. REV. 269, 369 (1999) (studying the analogous question
of what an appellate court should do when “confronted with facts that have changed since
the trial court made its findings” and concluding that there is “no ideal approach” for
resolving the issue).
27 See Arti K. Rai, Improving (Software) Patent Quality Through the Administrative Process, 51
HOUS. L. REV. 503, 536 (2013).
28 See infra Section IV.B.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-1\NDL106.txt unknown Seq: 7 30-NOV-16 11:40
2016] (in)valid  patents 277
PTO review in all but exceptional circumstances and placing additional limits
on the ability of accused infringers to pursue the same arguments both in
court and at the PTO.29
Before proceeding to the body of the Article, a note on terminology is in
order.  When a court rejects a challenge to patent validity but the PTO invali-
dates the same patent, the Article often characterizes the court and PTO
decisions as “conflicting.”  Yet it is possible that both decisions are actually
correct based on the governing law and the factual record.  For instance, the
record in a given case might be insufficient to show that a patent is invalid by
clear and convincing evidence, which means that a validity challenge in court
will fail, but the same record might be strong enough to show that the same
patent is invalid by a preponderance of the evidence, which will be sufficient
to obtain a ruling of invalidity from the PTO.30  Alternatively, the records
before the court and the PTO might be different, with the parties presenting
different invalidity arguments, which might also explain why a court rejected
a validity challenge but the PTO found the same patent to be invalid.31  Rec-
ognizing that the courts and the PTO are not necessarily deciding the same
legal question on the same factual record, the Article uses the term “conflict-
ing” (or synonyms such as “contrary” or “inconsistent”) as shorthand for the
more precise statement that a court has conclusively rejected a challenge to
patent validity while the PTO, in a contemporaneous post-issuance proceed-
ing, ruled that the same patent is invalid.  This Article’s objective is to deter-
mine which of those two decisions—which might both be correct—should
take precedence.32
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows.  Part I provides back-
ground on the various proceedings through which the courts and the PTO
evaluate patent validity.  Part II analyzes, in detail, several recent cases in
which the Federal Circuit has struggled to reconcile inconsistent court and
PTO rulings on patent validity.  Part III, the heart of the Article, critiques the
Federal Circuit’s absolute finality rule from a doctrinal perspective and con-
siders alternative approaches for resolving conflicting decisions.  Finally, Part
29 See infra Section IV.B.
30 Cf. In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that the PTO could
find that a particular prior art reference raised the “substantial new question of patentabil-
ity” required to institute reexamination even though the courts had previously held that
the same prior art reference did not anticipate (and therefore did not invalidate) the chal-
lenged patent).
31 See, e.g., Ivera Med. Corp. v. Hospira, Inc., 801 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(reversing a district court’s grant of summary judgment of invalidity even though the PTO,
in the first stage of a reexamination proceeding, had held the patent to be invalid, noting
that the examiner did not consider the declarations that, in the Federal Circuit’s view,
raised a factual dispute in the court case regarding the patent’s validity).
32 The differing legal standards and factual records in the two proceedings also
explain why, even though the Federal Circuit hears all appeals from both patent litigation
in district court and post-issuance review at the PTO, see 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012); 35
U.S.C. § 141(b)–(c) (2012), the Federal Circuit itself will not necessarily harmonize con-
flicting decisions when it reviews them on appeal.
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IV assesses the future of the absolute finality rule with an eye toward legisla-
tive reforms that could better harmonize proceedings in court and at the
PTO.
I. PARALLEL SYSTEMS OF PATENT ADJUDICATION
In the United States, both the federal courts and the PTO may review
the validity of an issued patent.  In those proceedings, the courts and the
PTO are ostensibly deciding the same question: Does the patent satisfy the
requirements of the federal Patent Act?  Yet on legal issues critical to deter-
mining patent validity, the substantive law differs depending on the forum,
which complicates the relationship between the two proceedings.
A. Litigation and Post-Issuance Review
Before examining that relationship, it is helpful to first provide some
background on the process of patent litigation in court and post-issuance
review at the PTO.  If a patent holder thinks someone is infringing its patent,
the patent holder may file an infringement suit in federal court.33  In
response to an infringement suit, accused infringers commonly raise three
defenses.  First, the accused infringer will argue that it does not, in fact,
infringe the patent.34  Second, the accused infringer will assert that the pat-
ent is unenforceable because, for instance, the patent holder obtained the
patent through misrepresentations to the PTO.35  Finally, and most impor-
tantly for the purpose of this Article, the accused infringer will claim that the
patent is invalid because it does not satisfy one or more requirements of the
33 See 35 U.S.C. § 281 (creating the claim for patent infringement); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338(a) (granting the federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction over cases “arising
under” the patent laws); Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Law Federalism, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 11,
29–34 (providing an overview of the law of subject matter jurisdiction in patent cases and
noting instances in which state courts may decide issues of patent law).  If the infringing
product is imported into the United States, the patent holder may also seek an exclusion
order from the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) under section 337 of the Tariff
Act. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012).  The ITC has become a more popular venue for patent
disputes in recent years as the courts have made it more difficult to obtain injunctive relief,
see Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2012), but the ITC still hears fewer than one hundred cases per
year, Number of Section 337 Investigations Instituted by Calendar Year, U.S. INT’L TRADE
COMM’N, http://www.usitc.gov/intellectual_property/documents/cy_337_institutions.pdf,
a mere fraction of the nearly 6000 cases commenced annually in the federal district courts,
see DOCKET NAVIGATOR, YEAR IN REVIEW 6 (2015), http://home.docketnavigator.com/year-
review.  For a general description of patent litigation at the ITC, see Sapna Kumar, The
Other Patent Agency: Congressional Regulation of the ITC, 61 FLA. L. REV. 529, 534–38 (2009).
34 See 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(1) (stating that noninfringement is a defense to a claim of
patent infringement).
35 See id. (stating that unenforceability is a defense to a claim of patent infringement);
see also Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(en banc) (describing the doctrine of inequitable conduct).
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Patent Act.36  The Patent Act requires, among other things, that a patent
claim patentable subject matter;37 that the claimed invention be useful,38
novel,39 and nonobvious;40 and that the patent adequately describe the
invention so others may practice it in the future.41
To obtain a court decision on patent validity, a potential infringer need
not wait for the patent holder to sue for infringement.  The Declaratory Judg-
ment Act allows a potential infringer to file its own lawsuit and seek a declara-
tion that the patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed, provided
there is an “actual controversy” between the parties.42
If a court decides that a patent is invalid, future defendants accused of
infringing that patent may, under the doctrine of issue preclusion, rely on
the previous judgment of invalidity as a complete defense.43  By contrast, if a
court rejects a challenge to the patent’s validity in one case, the patent
holder may not, in most circumstances, use that finding offensively against
another accused infringer in a later case44 because due process strictly limits
the use of preclusion against nonparties to a previous case.45  Hence the
adage: “Courts do not find patents ‘valid,’ only that the patent challenger did
not carry the ‘burden of establishing invalidity in the particular case before
the court.’”46
The PTO can also review the validity of an issued patent.  These PTO
proceedings are usually instigated by defendants in patent infringement liti-
gation or by those who are worried about becoming defendants in infringe-
36 See 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2)–(3) (stating that invalidity is a defense to a claim of patent
infringement).
37 Under the statute, patentable subject matter includes processes, machines, manu-
factures, and compositions of matter. Id. § 101.
38 Id.
39 Id. § 102.
40 Id. § 103.
41 Id. § 112(a).
42 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012); see also MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S.
118, 127 (2007) (applying the “actual controversy” requirement to a patent dispute).
43 Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971).  A
court decision of invalidity also binds the ITC in section 337 proceedings, see supra note 33,
although ITC decisions do not bind the courts in subsequent litigation. See Kumar, supra
note 33, at 558, 561–63 (citing cases).  Accordingly, just as the courts and the PTO can
disagree about the validity of a particular patent, the courts and the ITC can also reach
conflicting decisions. See Robert W. Hahn & Hal J. Singer, Assessing Bias in Patent Infringe-
ment Cases: A Review of International Trade Commission Decisions, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 457,
491–98 (2008) (citing examples).  For an argument that Congress should mandate that
ITC decisions receive preclusive effect in court, see Kumar, supra note 33, at 533.
44 See In re Constr. Equip. Co., 665 F.3d 1254, 1256 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
45 See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893 (2008).  For a critique of limits on nonparty
preclusion, see Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the “Day in Court” Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion,
67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 196–97 (1992).
46 Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1429 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (emphasis omitted)
(citation omitted) (first quoting Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 713 F.2d 693,
699 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1983); then quoting Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561,
1569 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
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ment litigation.  Like a court ruling that a patent is invalid, a PTO ruling of
invalidity nullifies the patent as against the entire world.47  As described in
more detail below, things are more complicated when the PTO ruling con-
firms a patent’s validity, but, in general, a PTO ruling of validity does not
prevent subsequent challenges to that patent’s validity.48  Conflicting court
and PTO decisions—the focus of this Article—can arise from several differ-
ent PTO proceedings, so an overview of those proceedings, and the differ-
ences among them, will prove helpful later on.
Congress created the first post-issuance proceeding to review patent
validity, ex parte reexamination, in 1980.49  In ex parte reexamination, any
person can challenge the validity of an issued patent based on other patents
or on printed publications in the prior art.50  In creating ex parte reexamina-
tion, the House Judiciary Committee suggested that the proceeding would be
an alternative to “expensive and lengthy infringement litigation” and that it
would permit a patent owner “to have the validity of his patent tested in the
Patent Office where the most expert opinions exist.”51
Under the statute, the PTO must institute reexamination if a request
raises “a substantial new question of patentability.”52  This standard is, in
practice, relatively lax, as the PTO initiates reexamination about ninety-two
percent of the time.53  (In the past two years, the PTO has received between
300 and 350 petitions for ex parte reexamination per year.54)  In a clear
47 See 35 U.S.C. § 307(a) (2012).
48 See infra Section I.B.
49 The PTO has long had the authority to reissue patents to cure errors in the original,
see Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218, 244 (1832); see also 35 U.S.C. § 251 (current reissue
statute) However, reissue proceedings can be initiated only at the request of the patentee,
so they are not particularly useful to potential infringers. See Russell E. Levine et. al., Ex
Parte Patent Practice and the Rights of Third Parties, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1987, 2008 (1996).
50 See 35 U.S.C. § 302.  The prior art is all the information relevant to a patent’s claim
of originality.  It includes not only the patents and printed publications that can provide
the basis for ex parte reexamination, but other forms of public knowledge, including prior
sales and public uses of the invention. See id. §§ 102(a), 103.  Because ex parte reexamina-
tion is based on prior art, the only invalidity grounds that can be raised are anticipation
under section 102 of the Patent Act and obviousness under section 103; many other impor-
tant requirements for patent validity, such as patentable subject matter under section 101
and adequate disclosure under section 112, cannot be challenged.
51 H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307, at 4 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460, 6462.
52 35 U.S.C. § 303(a).
53 See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., EX PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA 12 (Sept.
30, 2014) [hereinafter EX PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA], http://www.uspto.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/ex_parte_historical_stats_roll_up_EOY2014.pdf.  For criti-
cism of the PTO’s lax application of the “substantial new question of patentability” stan-
dard, see Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable Administrative Revocation
System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 48–50 (1997).
54 EX PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA, supra note 53.  This is down from a pre-AIA
high of 787 in 2012. Id. at 1.  The decrease is likely due not only to the availability of the
new inter partes review proceeding, but also to an increase in filing fees for ex parte reex-
amination from $2520 before the America Invents Act, Dennis Crouch, A Rush to File Ex
Parte Reexaminations and Now a Lull, PATENTLYO (Nov. 4, 2012), http://patentlyo.com/
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majority of initiated proceedings (sixty-six percent), the patent holder
amends the challenged claims to preserve their validity.55  In about a quarter
of initiated proceedings (twenty-two percent), the PTO confirms that all of
the claims are patentable without amendment.56  Outright invalidation is
rare in ex parte reexamination.  The PTO cancels all of the challenged
claims in only twelve percent of initiated proceedings.57  Once the PTO
decides to institute ex parte reexamination, the requester is excluded from
the process and reexamination proceeds in the same manner as prosecution
of the original application.58  Ex parte reexamination is perceived to be rela-
tively slow, but the process has sped up noticeably in the past few years as the
number of ex parte reexamination filings has tapered off in the wake of the
new proceedings created by the America Invents Act (and discussed
below).59
To give requesting parties the ability to play a more significant role, Con-
gress has created several post-issuance proceedings in addition to ex parte
reexamination.  In 1999, Congress created inter partes reexamination, which
has since evolved into the inter partes review proceeding created by the
AIA.60  As with ex parte reexamination, Congress appeared to view inter
partes reexamination as an alternative to litigation, with the House Confer-
ence Committee report claiming it that would “reduce[ ]” “the volume of
lawsuits in district courts.”61  In inter partes reexamination, the requester was
allowed to file written submissions each time the patent owner responded to
a PTO office action.62
Most participants in the patent system initially ignored inter partes reex-
amination, due to the limited nature of the patent challenger’s right to par-
ticipate, the long duration of the proceedings, and estoppel provisions that
required challengers to, essentially, choose to litigate validity either through
inter partes reexamination or in infringement litigation in court.63  (By con-
patent/2012/11/a-rush-to-file-ex-parte-reexaminations-and-now-a-lull.html, to $12,000
today, Dennis Crouch, USPTO Fee Change on March 19, PATENTLYO (Mar. 18, 2013), http://
patentlyo.com/patent/2013/03/uspto-fee-change-on-march-19.html.
55 See EX PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA, supra note 53, at 2.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 35 U.S.C. § 305 (2012).
59 See EX PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA, supra note 53, at 1 (reporting, as of Sep-
tember 2014, an average pendency of 22.3 months and a median pendency of 15.9
months, as compared to an average pendency of 27.8 months and a median pendency of
20.1 months only a year earlier).
60 Optional Inter Partes Reexamination Procedure Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113,
113 Stat. 1501, repealed by America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6, 125 Stat. 284,
299–313 (2011); see also infra text accompanying notes 79–88.
61 H.R. REP. NO. 106-464, at 133 (1999).
62 35 U.S.C. § 314(b)(2) (2006), repealed by America Invents Act § 6.
63 See KIMBERLY A. MOORE, TIMOTHY R. HOLBROOK & JOHN F. MURPHY, PATENT LITIGA-
TION AND STRATEGY 1132–33 (4th ed. 2013); Vishnubhakat et al., supra note 6, at 57
(reporting that inter partes reexamination took, on average, about three years, not includ-
ing time for appeals from the examiner’s decision); see also 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (providing
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trast, ex parte reexamination decisions have no estoppel effects on the
requester, which allows the requester to raise similar arguments both in its
reexamination petition and in litigation.64)  Although initially ignored, inter
partes reexamination was gaining popularity until 2011,65 when Congress
passed the AIA.  The AIA replaced inter partes reexamination with inter
partes review and created two new post-issuance proceedings, post-grant
review and a transitional review program for business method patents.66
Similar to reexamination, each of the new AIA proceedings begins when
a petitioner (usually a defendant in a patent infringement lawsuit) asks the
PTO to invalidate one or more patent claims.67  Rather than being consid-
ered by a single examiner, as is the case with a reexamination request, AIA
proceedings are conducted by a panel of three administrative patent judges
on the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), which the AIA also created.68
The new AIA proceedings are more litigation-like than reexamination.  Not
only is the patent challenger allowed to make written submissions through-
out the process, but, once the PTAB grants a petition for review, the parties
are entitled to discovery and an oral hearing.69  The proceedings are
designed to conclude relatively quickly, in most cases within one year of the
PTAB’s decision to institute.70
Although the three new proceedings created by the AIA are similar in
many ways, there are distinctions.  The first proceeding, post-grant review, is
available only for patents with a filing date on or after March 16, 2013.71  A
petition for post-grant review must be filed within nine months after the pat-
ent issues.72  Unlike in ex parte reexamination, where invalidity arguments
can be based only on prior patents and printed publications, a challenger in
post-grant review can raise any invalidity argument it could raise as a defense
in an infringement suit.73  The AIA, however, sets a relatively high bar for
initiating post-grant review, providing that the PTAB may institute proceed-
ings only if, based on the materials presented in the petition and in the pat-
that, if the PTO initiated inter partes reexamination and confirmed the patent’s validity,
the requester was precluded in litigation from raising any ground for invalidity that the
requester “raised or could have raised” during reexamination), repealed by America Invents
Act § 6.
64 But see infra text accompanying notes 136–38 (discussing the deference courts some-
times give to ex parte reexamination decisions).
65 U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION FILING DATA 1 (Sept. 30,
2013) [hereinafter INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION FILING DATA], http://www.uspto.gov/pat-
ents/stats/inter_parte_historical_stats_roll_up_ EOY2013.pdf.
66 See America Invents Act §§ 6, 18.
67 35 U.S.C. §§ 311(a), 321(a) (2012); 37 C.F.R. § 42.300(a) (2015).  For a succinct
overview of the three new proceedings, see Thomas King & Jeffrey A. Wolfson, PTAB Rear-
ranging the Face of Patent Litigation, 6 LANDSLIDE 18, 19 (2013).
68 See 35 U.S.C. § 6(b)–(c).
69 See id. §§ 316(a), 326(a).
70 See infra Section IV.A.
71 America Invents Act § 6(f)(2)(A).
72 35 U.S.C. § 321(c).
73 Id. § 321(b).
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ent holder’s response, the PTAB believes it is “more likely than not” that a
challenged claim is unpatentable.74  The PTO has yet to issue many patents
with filing dates on or after March 16, 2013, so few post-grant review petitions
have been filed to date.75
But even when patents eligible for post-grant review begin to issue in
larger numbers, the proceeding’s popularity may be stymied by stringent
estoppel provisions that bar a petitioner from raising, in later litigation, any
argument it raised or could have raised at the PTO.76  Because a petitioner in
post-grant review can challenge validity on practically any ground77 (unlike
ex parte reexamination and inter partes review, where the patent can be chal-
lenged only on the grounds of anticipation and obviousness),78 the estoppel
that flows from post-grant review could be extremely broad.
The second new proceeding, inter partes review, is the successor to inter
partes reexamination and is currently the most popular post-issuance pro-
ceeding at the PTO.79  Inter partes review can be sought for any patent for
which post-grant review is not available, meaning patents that either have a
filing date before March 16, 2013, or have a filing date on or after March 16,
2013, but for which the nine-month window for post-grant review has
expired.80  The prior art in inter partes review is, as in ex parte reexamina-
tion, limited to prior patents and printed publications.81  Although a peti-
tioner in inter partes review is estopped from asserting in later litigation any
ground for invalidity it could have raised at the PTO,82 the only invalidity
arguments the petitioner may assert in inter partes review are anticipation
and obviousness,83 meaning that estoppel is less of a deterrent than it is in
74 Id. § 324(a).
75 See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD STATISTICS 1 (July
31, 2016) [hereinafter PTAB STATISTICS], http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/docu-
ments/2016-07-31%20PTAB.pdf (reporting that thirty petitions have been filed).
76 35 U.S.C. § 325(e)(2).
77 Id. § 321(b).
78 Id. §§ 301(a)(1), 302, 311(b).
79 In 2014, the PTO received 1310 petitions for inter partes review, 343 requests for ex
parte reexamination, 177 petitions for covered business method review (another new AIA
proceeding discussed below), and two petitions for post-grant review, for a total of 1832.
See PTAB STATISTICS, supra note 75, at 1; EX PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA, supra note
53, at 1.  By comparison, in 2011 (the final year before the America Invents Act took
effect), the PTO received 759 petitions for ex parte reexamination and 374 petitions for
inter partes reexamination, for a total of 1133. See EX PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA,
supra note 53, at 1; INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION FILING DATA, supra note 65, at 1.
80 35 U.S.C. § 311(c).
81 Id. § 311(b).
82 Id. § 315(e)(2).
83 See id. § 311(b).  A finding that a patent is anticipated means that the patent lacks
the novelty required by section 102 of the Patent Act.  Although aspects of the analysis
under section 102 can be complicated, see Mark A. Lemley, Does “Public Use” Mean the Same
Thing It Did Last Year?, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1119, 1119–20 (2015), a finding of anticipation
basically means that the claimed invention is identically disclosed in the prior art. A find-
ing of obviousness, by contrast, is a finding that the invention, although not identically
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post-grant review.  If the petitioner is a defendant in a patent infringement
lawsuit, the petitioner must seek review of the allegedly infringed patent
within one year of service of the complaint.84
The standard for instituting inter partes review is higher than the “sub-
stantial new question of patentability” standard of ex parte reexamination,
but lower than the “more likely than not” unpatentable standard of post-
grant review.  Specifically, the PTAB will institute inter partes review if it
determines “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would pre-
vail” on at least one of the challenged patent claims.85  Unlike ex parte reex-
amination, which is instituted over ninety percent of the time, the PTAB has,
as of July 31, 2016, granted just over half of all requests to institute inter
partes review (1738 of 3410), with another eighteen percent of petitions (599
of 3410) settling before the PTAB decided whether to institute proceed-
ings.86  Inter partes review is, however, far more likely than ex parte reexami-
nation to conclude with a ruling of invalidity, in part because the right to
amend the patent claims is quite limited in AIA proceedings.87  The PTAB
has held all of the instituted claims unpatentable in over seventy percent of
proceedings that have reached a final decision (764 of 1086).88
The third and final proceeding created by the America Invents Act is
covered business method review, which is available for patents that claim “a
method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other
operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a finan-
cial product or service.”89  According to the House Judiciary Committee
report on the AIA, the program was enacted in response to an abundance of
“poor business-method patents” issued during the late 1990s and early 2000s
that fueled a rise in “patent ‘troll’ lawsuits.”90
For eligible business method patents with a filing date before March 16,
2013, a petition for covered business method review can be filed at any
time.91  For patents with filing dates on or after March 16, 2013, a petition
for covered business method review can be filed only after the nine-month
window for seeking post-grant review expires or after any post-grant review
proceeding concludes, whichever is later.92  A petition for covered business
disclosed, would have been obvious based on the prior art and as judged from the perspec-
tive of a person with ordinary skill in the art. See 35 U.S.C. § 103.
84 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).
85 Id. § 314(a).
86 PTAB STATISTICS, supra note 75, at 8–9.
87 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 316(d)(1) (allowing the patent owner to file only one motion to
amend); see also U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., MOTION TO AMEND STUDY 6 (2016), http://
www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016-04-30%20PTAB%20MTA%20study
.pdf (reporting that the PTAB granted only six motions to amend in the first three-and-a-
half years of AIA proceedings).
88 PTAB STATISTICS, supra note 75, at 9.
89 America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(d)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 331 (2011).
90 H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 54 (2011), reprinted in 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. 67, 84.
91 America Invents Act § 18(a)(2).
92 Id.
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method review, like a petition for post-grant review, can raise any ground for
invalidity,93 but, unlike in post-grant review or inter partes review, estoppel is
limited to the grounds actually raised by the petitioner at the PTO.94  A peti-
tioner seeking covered business method review must, however, either (1) be
the defendant in a lawsuit for infringement or (2) have been accused of
infringement by the patent holder to the extent that the petitioner would
have standing to file a declaratory judgment suit in federal court.95  As with
post-grant review, the PTAB may institute covered business method review if
it is more likely than not that a claim is unpatentable.96  Covered business
method review is a temporary program that, as it currently stands, will be
available only until September 15, 2020.97  As of July 31, 2016, the PTAB has
granted just over half of all requests to institute covered business method
review (206 of 372), with another thirteen percent of petitions (49 of 372)
settling before the PTAB decided whether to institute review.98  An instituted
covered business method review is even more likely to end with a ruling of
invalidity than inter partes review.  The PTAB has held all of the instituted
claims unpatentable in over eighty percent of covered business method
review proceedings that have reached a final decision (108 of 134).99
Parties who seek post-issuance review at the PTO are, as noted, fre-
quently defendants in patent infringement litigation.  Those defendants
often ask the district court to stay the infringement case pending the out-
come of PTO proceedings.  The Patent Act offers little guidance to courts in
making this decision, so courts have developed a three-factor test to deter-
mine whether a stay is warranted, considering: “(1) whether discovery is com-
plete and whether a trial date has been set; (2) whether a stay will simplify
the issues in question and trial of the case; and (3) whether a stay would
unduly prejudice or present a clear tactical disadvantage to the nonmoving
party.”100  The covered business method review statute is an exception to the
legislative silence on litigation stays.  It adopts a test that repeats the three
factors noted above and adds a fourth factor of “whether a stay . . . will
reduce the burden of litigation on the parties and on the court,”101 which
93 Id. § 18(a)(1)(B).
94 Id. § 18(a)(1)(D).
95 Id. § 18(a)(1)(B); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.302(a) (2015).  By contrast, anyone (besides the
patent owner) can file a petition for inter partes review or post-grant review.  35 U.S.C.
§§ 311(a), 321(a) (2012).
96 See America Invents Act § 18(a)(1).
97 Id. § 18(a)(3).
98 PTAB STATISTICS, supra note 75, at 8, 10.
99 Id. at 10.
100 E.g., Universal Elecs., Inc. v. Universal Remote Control, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 2d 1028,
1030–31 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (quoting Aten Int’l Co. v. Emine Tech. Co., No. 09-0843, 2010
WL 1462110, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2010)).
101 America Invents Act § 18(b)(1)(D).
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supporters of the AIA believed to place a “heavy thumb on the scale in favor
of a stay.”102
By staying litigation, a court can avoid issuing a ruling on patent validity
that conflicts with the PTO’s assessment.  Across all post-issuance proceed-
ings, district courts grant motions seeking stays of litigation roughly sixty per-
cent of the time.103  The grant rate for stays pending an instituted inter
partes review is higher, with commentators reporting grant rates of roughly
eighty percent.104  In that vein, one Federal Circuit judge, sitting by designa-
tion in a district court, suggested that “after the PTAB has instituted review
proceedings, the parallel district court litigation ordinarily should be
stayed.”105
That said, it is not uncommon for a court to deny a stay pending inter
partes review if the accused infringer delays in seeking PTO review,106 if
there are patent claims in the case on which the PTO has not instituted
review,107 or if the parties are direct competitors in the market.108  Moreo-
ver, courts are generally perceived to be reluctant to grant stays pending ex
parte reexamination because outright invalidation of the patent is rare in
that proceeding.109  Individual courts and judges also vary widely in their
proclivity to grant stays.  Importantly, the Eastern District of Texas—the fed-
eral judicial district that handles the most patent cases, over forty percent of
all patent cases filed nationwide110—seems reluctant to stay litigation pend-
102 157 CONG. REC. 3416 (2011) (statement of Sen. Schumer).  Also, in an exception to
the usual rule that only final judgments are appealable, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1295(a)(1)
(2012), the covered business method review statute permits immediate appeal of a stay
decision to the Federal Circuit, America Invents Act § 18(b)(2), provided that the PTAB
has decided to institute covered business method review, Intellectual Ventures II LLC v.
JPMorgan Chase & Co., 781 F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
103 See supra note 7.
104 See Love & Ambwani, supra note 6.  The eighty percent figure covers 171 motions to
stay filed between September 2012 and March 2014 and includes stay motions that were
granted only in part. See id. at 96, 104 n.39.
105 NFC Tech. LLC v. HTC Am., Inc., No. 2:13-CV-1058, 2015 WL 1069111, at *7 (E.D.
Tex. Mar. 11, 2015) (Bryson, J., sitting by designation).
106 See, e.g., Universal Elecs., Inc. v. Universal Remote Control, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 2d
1028, 1031 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (denying a stay when the accused infringer “did not file its
inter partes review petitions until almost a year after being served with the complaint”).
107 See, e.g., Tire Hanger Corp. v. My Car Guy Concierge Servs. Inc., No. 5:14-CV-00549-
ODW(MANx), slip op. at 2 (C.D. Cal. June 16, 2015).
108 See, e.g., Courtesy Prods., LLC v. Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc., Civ. No. 13-2012-
SLR/SRF, slip op. at 2 (D. Del. Sept. 1, 2015).
109 See Robert Greene Sterne et al., Reexamination Practice with Concurrent District Court
Patent Litigation, 9 SEDONA CONF. J. 53, 61 (2008).  Some data suggests, however, that courts
grant motions to stay pending ex parte reexamination and motions to stay pending inter
partes review at similar rates. See Success Rates for Motions to Stay Pending Reexamination, supra
note 7.
110 Dennis Crouch, The Concentrated Market of Patent Jurisdictions, PATENTLYO (Oct. 8,
2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/10/concentrated-patent-jurisdictions.html.
For explorations of the dynamics that have led the Eastern District of Texas, headquar-
tered in the town of Marshall (population 23,523), to become the nation’s leading patent
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ing PTO review.  Since 2013 (the year that AIA post-issuance proceedings
began), the Eastern District has granted only about forty percent of stay
motions that were contested (that is, not stipulated).  By comparison, the
Northern District of California, which is consistently one of the top five dis-
tricts in number of patent cases filed, has granted nearly seventy percent of
contested motions to stay during that same time period.111
Because litigation is often stayed pending PTO review, cases in which a
court and the PTO issue contrary, contemporaneous rulings on patent valid-
ity—the focus of this Article—are exceptional.  But, as illustrated by the cases
discussed below, conflicting decisions do occur, and, when they occur, the
stakes are high.  Judgments of tens or hundreds of millions of dollars hang in
the balance, as do injunctions against continued infringement that have the
potential to reshape competition in a particular industry.
B. The Relationship Between the Parallel Systems
Conflicting decisions between the courts and the PTO occur in part
because the two forums apply different law in assessing patent validity.  The
most significant differences involve the burden of proof on invalidity and the
standards used to construe the claims of the patent.
The Patent Act states that issued patents are presumed to be valid.112
This presumption means that a litigant challenging patent validity in court
must prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence.113  In post-issuance
review at the PTO, by contrast, the presumption of validity does not apply,114
so the standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence.115  Thus, as the
Federal Circuit has noted, “the PTO in reexamination proceedings and the
court system in patent infringement actions ‘take different approaches in
determining validity and on the same evidence could quite correctly come to
different conclusions.’”116
The courts and the PTO also take different approaches to the critical
question of claim construction.  Claim construction is the process by which
the judge decides what the claims of the patent mean, a ruling that is impor-
tant to determining both validity and infringement.117  Under Federal Cir-
trial court, see J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 631,
651–54 (2015); Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 270–77
(2016).
111 One can verify or update these numbers by using the motion success tool available
on DOCKET NAVIGATOR, http://home.docketnavigator.com.
112 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012).
113 Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 102 (2011).
114 In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc).
115 In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting In re Caveney, 761
F.2d 671, 674 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
116 In re Baxter Int’l, Inc., 678 F.3d 1357, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Swanson, 540
F.3d at 1377).
117 See Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1791, 1831–32 (2013).
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cuit law, a court construing a term in a patent claim begins by trying to
determine “the ordinary and customary meaning” that the term would have
to “a person of ordinary skill in the art.”118  If that meaning is not “immedi-
ately apparent,” the court can consider other evidence of the term’s mean-
ing, including: language used elsewhere in the patent’s claims, the detailed
description of the invention included in the patent document (called the
specification, in patent parlance), the patent’s prosecution history (that is,
the record of communication between the patent applicant and the PTO
that preceded issuance of the patent), and extrinsic evidence of the term’s
meaning, including expert testimony, dictionaries, and treatises.119
Although various sources can provide evidence of claim meaning, the court’s
objective is simple: “to ascertain precisely what it is that is patented.”120
The PTO, by contrast, gives patent claims their “broadest reasonable
construction” in light of the patent’s specification.121  As the Federal Circuit
has observed: “The broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim term may
be the same as or broader than [a court’s] construction of a term . . . . But it
cannot be narrower.”122  A primary justification for the PTO’s broadest rea-
sonable construction standard is that patent claims in proceedings at the
PTO can be amended, so a patent applicant or patent owner faced with a
broad claim construction that renders the claim anticipated or obvious can
revise that claim to avoid the prior art.123  In regulations implementing the
AIA, the PTO adopted the broadest reasonable construction standard for the
new proceedings created by the Act, reasoning, among other things, that it
would be impractical to apply different claim construction standards in dif-
ferent proceedings.124
The broader claim construction at the PTO, like the lower burden of
proof, renders patents more vulnerable to invalidation at the PTO than in
court.125  A broader claim is more likely to encompass technology already
disclosed in the prior art, making that claim invalid for anticipation or obvi-
ousness.  Although the opportunity to amend claims in post-issuance pro-
ceedings at the PTO mitigates the risk of invalidation, the right to amend is
limited in AIA proceedings, and successful motions to amend in inter partes
review have been rare.126
118 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
119 Id. at 1314.
120 Id. at 1312 (quoting Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 570 (1876)).
121 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.555(b), 42.100(b), 42.200(b), 42.300(b) (2015).
122 Facebook, Inc. v. Pragmatus AV, LLC, 582 F. App’x 864, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
123 See In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
124 Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, Post-Grant Review Pro-
ceedings, and Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, 77 Fed. Reg.
48,680, 48,697–98 (Aug. 14, 2012).  The Supreme Court recently upheld the PTO’s use of
the broadest reasonable construction standard in AIA proceedings. Cuozzo Speed Techs.
v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142 (2016).
125 See Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2145.
126 See supra note 87.
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The differences in the legal doctrines applied by the courts and the PTO
complicate the relationship between the two forums.  Recently, in B&B Hard-
ware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc., the Supreme Court held—in a case involv-
ing the trademark side of the PTO, no less—that decisions of administrative
agencies can preclude relitigation in court, and vice versa, so long as the
ordinary requirements of issue preclusion are satisfied.127  One of those
requirements is that both tribunals are deciding the same issue.128  In B&B
Hardware, the Court ruled that the PTO’s finding during trademark registra-
tion that a mark was likely to cause confusion with a previously registered
mark could preclude the parties from relitigating likelihood of confusion in
later trademark infringement litigation.129  But, cognizant of the “same
issue” requirement, the Court added, somewhat ambiguously, that for issue
preclusion to apply, the trademark owner must have been using its mark in
ways that were “materially the same” as the uses described in its registration
application.130  In parallel patent disputes, however, there is no ambiguity
about whether issue preclusion exists.  The differing burdens of proof and
standards of claim construction applied by the courts and the PTO unequivo-
cally mean that the “same issue” requirement is not met.131  Thus, an
infringer who has unsuccessfully tried to invalidate a patent in court is not
precluded from asking the PTO to reassess the validity of the same patent.132
Things are more complicated when it is the PTO, rather than a court,
that first rejects a challenge to patent validity.  In that circumstance, it might
seem that an accused infringer who cannot satisfy the lower burden of proof
at the PTO should not be permitted to reassert the same invalidity arguments
in court, where the burden of proof is higher, even if the issues are not tech-
nically “the same” for the purpose of agency-court issue preclusion under
B&B Hardware.  Indeed, the AIA explicitly prohibits an accused infringer
who has pursued a PTAB proceeding to a final decision from raising in litiga-
127 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1299 (2015).
128 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. c, § 28 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST.
1982).  Other requirements are that the issue was actually litigated and necessary to the
judgment and that the party opposing preclusion had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the issue. See infra note 299.
129 135 S. Ct. at 1299.
130 Id. at 1308.  This caveat places a potentially significant limit on the availability of
court-agency preclusion in trademark proceedings.  In trademark infringement suits, the
likelihood-of-confusion analysis considers the mark’s use “in the ‘entire marketplace con-
text,’” but marketplace uses “are often not fully disclosed in the . . . registrations consid-
ered by the [PTO].”  Brendan J. Ketchum, Keeping Tabs: When Will T.T.A.B. Decisions Have
Preclusive Effect? Preclusive Effect of T.T.A.B. Likelihood of Confusion Decisions After B&B v. Har-
gis Industries, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 141, 157–58 (2015).
131 For further discussion of why court and PTO decisions on patent validity do not
satisfy the ordinary elements of issue preclusion, see infra subsection III.B.2.
132 Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1428–29, 1429 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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tion any argument it raised or, in the case of inter partes review and post-
grant review, could have raised before the PTAB.133
The ex parte reexamination statute, however, does not address the issue
of repetitive arguments for invalidity.  Moreover, an accused infringer who
merely asks the PTO to institute an ex parte reexamination is not technically
a party to the reexamination proceeding, defeating another prerequisite for
issue preclusion (in addition to the “same issue” requirement).134  Accord-
ingly, a PTO decision confirming patentability in ex parte reexamination
does not (and, as a matter of constitutional due process, probably could not)
preclude the accused infringer from attempting to establish invalidity in sub-
sequent litigation.135  That said, the Federal Circuit has suggested that confir-
mation in ex parte reexamination can make an accused infringer’s burden of
proving invalidity in litigation “more difficult to sustain.”136  The Federal Cir-
cuit has also stated that a court “must consider” the examiner’s decision in
deciding whether the infringer has proved invalidity in subsequent litiga-
tion.137  Thus, although the PTO’s confirmation of a patent’s validity in ex
parte reexamination does not preclude a future challenge to that patent’s
validity in court, the PTO’s decision does receive some ill-defined form of
deference.138
Although the AIA, unlike the ex parte reexamination statute, explicitly
prohibits certain types of repetitive litigation, it also leaves several important
questions unanswered.  For instance, the statutory prohibition on reasserting
arguments that were rejected by or could have been raised before the PTAB
does not arise unless and until the PTAB issues a “final written decision.”139
A decision instituting or declining to institute review is therefore outside the
statute’s scope, and courts have reached divergent results about how those
PTAB decisions should affect litigation, if at all.  Some district courts have
allowed patent holders to inform the jury that the PTAB denied the accused
133 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(e)(2), 325(e)(2) (2012); America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29,
§ 18(a)(1)(D), 125 Stat. 284, 330 (2011).  The AIA estoppel provisions also apply in any
future proceedings in the International Trade Commission. See supra notes 33, 43.
134 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
135 See, e.g., Edizone, LC v. Cloud Nine, LLC, 505 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1230 (D. Utah
2007) (refusing to grant summary judgment of validity in favor of the patent holder even
though the PTO had, in reexamination, recently confirmed the validity of the asserted
patents).
136 Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1984),
abrogated on other grounds by Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
137 Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132, 1139 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (quoting
Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 755 F.2d 1549, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
138 See generally Tun-Jen Chiang, The Advantages of Inter Partes Reexamination, 90 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 579, 586 (2008) (“While ex parte reexamination does not create
litigation estoppel de facto, it comes fairly close to doing so.”); Janis, supra note 53, at 82
n.355 (“[T]he presumption of validity, while not technically ‘strengthened’ during reex-
amination . . . may be harder to overcome as to claims that have been tested by
reexamination.”).
139 E.g., 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) (2012).
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infringer’s petition for review.140  Other courts, by contrast, have emphasized
“the different standards, procedures and presumptions” that apply in court
and at the PTAB, and have prohibited litigants from referring to post-issu-
ance proceedings involving the patent-in-suit.141
As for claim construction, the Federal Circuit has held that, in an ex
parte reexamination, the PTO cannot be bound by a district court claim con-
struction because the PTO is not a party to district court litigation.142  The
patent holder, by contrast, is a party to both the litigation and to any post-
issuance review proceeding.  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit has held—
despite the differing claim construction standards that would seem to defeat
issue preclusion—that a district court’s prior claim construction can bind a
patent owner in ex parte reexamination.143  In the new proceedings created
by the AIA, however, the PTAB has not applied that principle broadly.
Although it is not uncommon for the PTAB to adopt a district court’s previ-
ous claim construction,144 particularly when the parties urge it to do so,145
the PTAB has made clear that, because it applies a different claim construc-
tion standard, it construes claims independently.146
Similarly, the courts generally acknowledge that they are not bound by
the PTO’s claim construction because of the PTO’s use of the broadest rea-
sonable construction standard.147  But it is not unusual for courts to acknowl-
edge that PTO claim construction can be “helpful” to the court.148  Indeed,
140 See, e.g., StoneEagle Servs., Inc. v. Pay-Plus Sols., Inc., No. 8:13-cv-2240, 2015 WL
3824208, at *9 (M.D. Fla. June 19, 2015).
141 E.g., Ultratec, Inc. v. Sorenson Commc’ns, Inc., No. 13-cv-346, 2014 WL 5023098, at
*2 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 8, 2014); see also Wis. Alumni Research Found. v. Apple, Inc., 135 F.
Supp. 3d 865, 874 (W.D. Wis. 2015) (collecting conflicting decisions).
142 In re Trans Tex. Holdings Corp., 498 F.3d 1290, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
143 In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
144 See, e.g., Veeam Software Corp. v. Symantec Corp., No. IPR2013-00150, 2013 WL
8595506, at *3 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 7, 2013).
145 See, e.g., Google Inc. v. SimpleAir, Inc., No. IPR2015-00180, 2015 WL 2159342, at
*5–6 (P.T.A.B. May 5, 2015).
146 See, e.g., SAP Am., Inc. v. Versata Dev. Grp., Inc., No. CBM2012-00001, 2013 WL
3167735, at *13 (P.T.A.B. June 11, 2013).  Just because the PTAB construes claims inde-
pendently, however, does not mean it can simply ignore a court’s prior claim construction.
See Power Integrations, Inc. v. Lee, 797 F.3d 1318, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“The fact that the
[PTAB] is not generally bound by a previous judicial interpretation of a disputed claim
term does not mean . . . that it has no obligation to acknowledge that interpretation or to
assess whether it is consistent with the broadest reasonable construction of the term.”).
147 See, e.g., Va. Innovation Scis., Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 983 F. Supp. 2d 713, 767
(E.D. Va. 2014), vacated on other grounds, 614 Fed. App’x 503 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also
SkyHawke Techs., LLC v. Deca Int’l Corp., 828 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (noting
that “[b]ecause the [PTAB] applies the broadest reasonable construction of the claims
while the district courts apply a different standard . . . the issue of claim construction . . . to
be determined by the district court has not been actually litigated” for the purpose of issue
preclusion).
148 E.g., Black Hills Media, LLC v. Pioneer Elecs. (USA) Inc., No. 14-00471, 2014 WL
4638170, at *6 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2014); see also SurfCast, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 6 F. Supp.
3d 136, 142 (D. Me. 2014) (“The PTO’s construction is persuasive but not binding on this
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it is well-established that the PTO’s interpretation of the claims, including
during post-issuance proceedings, is important evidence of claim meaning in
subsequent litigation.149
As this discussion suggests, the relationship between patent litigation in
court and post-issuance review at the PTO is complicated, unpredictable, and
often defined through ad hoc decisions by federal district judges and the
PTAB.  This background will help in answering the complex and controver-
sial issue to which the Article now turns: What happens if a court finds a
patent to be infringed and rejects a challenge to the patent’s validity, but the
PTO, at roughly the same time, finds the patent to be invalid?150
II. CONFLICTING DECISIONS IN CONCURRENT PROCEEDINGS
As the popularity of post-issuance review at the PTO has grown, the ques-
tion of how the PTO’s invalidation of a patent affects concurrent infringe-
ment litigation has become exceedingly important.  Yet, to date, few
commentators have tried to answer that question.151  This Part provides a
Court.”). But see, e.g., Smartflash, LLC v. Apple, Inc., No. 6:13-cv-447, 2014 WL 3366661, at
*4 (E.D. Tex. July 8, 2014) (“It is . . . unlikely that the claim construction aspect of the
[covered business method] review would significantly simplify the issues before the Court
because [t]he PTAB and district courts construe claims under different standards.”).
149 See, e.g., Xerox Corp. v. 3Com Corp., 267 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also
Alyus Networks, Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 13-cv-04700, 2016 WL 270387, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan.
21, 2016) (holding the patentee to statements about claim scope made during inter partes
review); Timothy R. Holbrook, The Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s Evolving Impact on Claim
Construction, 24 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 28), http://ssrn
.com/abstract=2828962 (suggesting that, based on the similarities between PTAB proceed-
ings and district court litigation, PTAB claim constructions could be entitled to preclusive
effect in district court litigation and vice versa).
150 To be clear, when the opposite happens—that is, the PTO rejects a challenge to
validity but a court invalidates the patent—there is no uncertainty about the patent’s legal
status.  It is invalid against the entire world under Blonder-Tongue. See supra notes 2–4 and
accompanying text.  For an interesting and very recent twist on that factual scenario, see
Rembrandt Soc. Media, LP v. Facebook, Inc., 640 F. App’x 943 (Fed. Cir. 2016), in which the
district court found two patents asserted by Rembrandt to be invalid and not infringed but
the PTAB, roughly a year later, found that several claims of those patents were not invalid.
Id. at 947.  On appeal from the district court proceeding, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
judgment in favor of the accused infringer on the ground of noninfringement, thereby
avoiding Rembrandt’s argument that the PTAB decision in favor of the patent holder
should trump the district court’s ruling of invalidity. Id. at 949.
151 The few scholarly papers that have explored the issue of conflicting court and PTO
decisions on patent validity include an article critiquing the PTO’s failure to give defer-
ence to the Federal Circuit’s resolution of legal (as opposed to factual) questions relevant
to patent validity, such as obviousness, Paul M. Janicke, An Interim Proposal for Fixing Ex Parte
Reexamination’s Messy Side, 4 HLRE 43, 58–59 (2013), a student note that predates the Fed-
eral Circuit’s latest decisions on finality, Betsy Johnson, Note, Plugging the Holes in the Ex
Parte Reexamination Statute: Preventing a Second Bite at the Apple for a Patent Infringer, 55 CATH.
U. L. REV. 305 (2005), and a student note focusing on how ex parte reexamination could
be better coordinated with litigation, Christopher Ilardi, Note, The Broken System of Parallel
Patent Proceedings: How to Create a Unified, One-Judgment System, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 2213
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descriptive account to fill that gap.  To be clear up front: the story is compli-
cated.  Cases involving concurrent proceedings in court and at the PTO are
inevitably complex, and seemingly minor facts and procedural details can
play a crucial role.  The story begins with two unpublished Federal Circuit
opinions decided nearly fifteen years apart that provided scant reasoning but
that likely influenced the Federal Circuit’s current approach.  And it ends
with a deeply divided Federal Circuit, having decided three contentious cases
on the issue in three years, denying a petition for rehearing en banc by a tie
vote of five to five.  In between are several fractured panel decisions of ques-
tionable reasoning and numerous dissenting and concurring opinions dis-
cussing matters as wide-ranging as preclusion law, the proper interpretation
of the Patent Act, separation of powers, and the fundamental fairness of pat-
ent proceedings.  The question of how to handle conflicting validity deci-
sions between the courts and the PTO has, in short, emerged as one of the
most contentious issues in patent law today.  A deep dive into the Federal
Circuit caselaw governing that issue provides a basis for the normative analy-
sis that follows.
A. Foreshadowing the Absolute Finality Rule
Until 2013, the Federal Circuit had addressed the question of how the
PTO’s invalidation of a patent affects ongoing patent infringement proceed-
ings in only two opinions, both of which were unpublished.152  Although the
opinions were not precedential, they foreshadowed the court’s current
approach, which gives primacy to a PTO decision of invalidity unless court
proceedings are absolutely final.
In the first unpublished decision, Standard Havens Products, Inc. v. Gencor
Industries, Inc.,153 the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri
had ruled that Standard Havens’ patent was infringed by Gencor and that
(2015).  Perhaps most on-point is a recent student comment arguing, contrary to the abso-
lute finality rule embraced by the Federal Circuit, that district courts should have discre-
tion to adhere to a prior decision in favor of the patent holder despite an intervening PTO
ruling of invalidity. Ben Picozzi, Comment, Reimagining Finality in Parallel Patent Proceed-
ings, 125 YALE L.J. 2519, 2520 (2016).  The Federal Circuit’s latest decisions seem to have
finally drawn attention to the issue of parallel court-PTO proceedings, as yet another stu-
dent note on the topic appeared in print shortly before this Article went to press. See
Peggy P. Ni, Rethinking Finality in the PTAB Age, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 557, 586 (2016)
(criticizing Federal Circuit law for encouraging “gamesmanship” in parallel proceedings).
152 Several high-profile cases had the potential to involve inconsistent court and PTO
rulings on patent validity, but those cases settled before final resolution. See, e.g.,
MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 560 (E.D. Va. 2007) (noting that
the PTO had issued non-final reexamination decisions that the patents, which the district
court had found to be infringed, were invalid for obviousness), appeal dismissed as moot, 273
F. App’x 857 (Fed. Cir. 2008); E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
720 F. Supp. 373, 381 (D. Del. 1989) (similar), appeal dismissed as moot, 988 F.2d 129 (Fed.
Cir. 1993).
153 996 F.2d 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision).
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Gencor failed to prove that the patent was invalid.154  The court awarded
$5.9 million in damages and entered an injunction against Gencor’s contin-
ued infringement.155  On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the rulings on
validity and infringement but remanded for further proceedings related to
damages and the injunction.156  While that Federal Circuit appeal was pend-
ing, the PTO, at Gencor’s behest, had begun an ex parte reexamination of
Standard Havens’ patent.157  The PTO ultimately ruled that the patent was
invalid,158 and Standard Havens appealed that decision by filing a civil suit in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.159
While that suit was pending, Gencor filed a motion in the Western Dis-
trict of Missouri to stay further proceedings in the infringement case.160  The
Missouri district court denied the motion, reasoning that, because of the Fed-
eral Circuit’s affirmance of its prior ruling on validity and infringement, Stan-
dard Havens possessed “the equivalent of a final judgment” on those
issues.161  Considering the potential impact of a future ruling by the D.C.
district court in the suit challenging the PTO’s reexamination decision, the
Missouri district court noted that it was aware of “no case or rule of law that
holds that a final judgment in a separate lawsuit, in a separate jurisdiction,
which may or may not be rendered at some undetermined point in the
future would control and, indeed, void this Court’s judgment in this case.”162
The Federal Circuit reversed the Missouri district court’s denial of
Gencor’s stay motion.163  In a terse, unpublished opinion that provided little
reasoning (and cited no pertinent authority), the court wrote:
The district court incorrectly concluded that the reexamination deci-
sion can have no effect on this infringement suit even if the reexamination
decision becomes final.  As a matter of law, . . . if the reexamination decision
of unpatentability is upheld in the court action . . . , the injunction would
thereby immediately become inoperative.  In addition, if a final decision of
unpatentability means the patent was void ab initio, then damages would also
be precluded.164
154 Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 810 F. Supp. 1072, 1073 (W.D.
Mo. 1993), rev’d, 996 F.2d 1236.
155 Id.
156 Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 1376 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
157 Id. at 1366.
158 Standard Havens, 810 F. Supp. at 1073.
159 Id. After the America Invents Act, it is no longer possible to challenge the PTO’s
reexamination decisions through a civil suit; the only route for appeal is to the Federal
Circuit.  35 U.S.C. § 141(b) (2012).
160 Standard Havens, 810 F. Supp. at 1073.
161 Id. at 1074, 1077.
162 Id. at 1076.
163 Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 996 F.2d 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(per curiam) (unpublished table decision).
164 Id.
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Nearly fifteen years later, the Federal Circuit again encountered conflict-
ing court and PTO decisions in concurrent proceedings.  In Translogic Tech-
nology, Inc. v. Hitachi, Ltd., the Federal Circuit vacated a district court decision
awarding damages in light of the PTO’s subsequent invalidation of the pat-
ent.165  In that case, a jury had awarded Translogic $86.5 million in damages
for infringement.166  While post-verdict motions were pending in the district
court, the PTO invalidated Translogic’s patent in a reexamination proceed-
ing requested by Hitachi, the defendant in the infringement case.167  The
district court eventually entered judgment on the jury verdict, and both
Hitachi’s appeal in the infringement case and Translogic’s appeal from the
PTO reexamination ended up in the Federal Circuit at the same time.168  In
one opinion, the Federal Circuit affirmed the PTO decision, holding that the
patent was invalid for obviousness.169  Then, in an unpublished opinion
issued the same day, the Federal Circuit vacated the judgment in the
infringement litigation and remanded with instructions that the district court
dismiss the case.170  As in Standard Havens, the Federal Circuit cited no
authority for the principle that the PTO’s decision required vacatur of the
district court’s prior ruling on validity and infringement.171
B. The Absolute Finality Rule
Although the Federal Circuit rarely considered how the PTO’s invalida-
tion of a patent affects concurrent infringement litigation in the first thirty
years of the court’s existence, the court has decided three major cases on the
issue in the past three years.  The first case, Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Inter-
national, Inc.,172 confirmed what the Federal Circuit had suggested in its
prior unpublished opinions: a PTO decision of invalidity takes precedence
over a court ruling on the issue of validity so long as any issue of liability or
damages remains pending in the court case.  The second case, Versata Com-
puter Industry Solutions, Inc. v. SAP AG,173 illustrates the immediate impact of
the Federal Circuit’s adoption of the absolute finality rule, with the patent
holder engaging in procedural maneuvering to expedite the conclusion of
infringement litigation and the infringer plotting to delay the litigation to
take advantage of a PTO ruling of invalidity.  And in the third decision, ePlus,
Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc.,174 the Federal Circuit extended the absolute
finality rule by holding that a PTO decision could not only take precedence
165 250 F. App’x 988 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
166 Translogic Tech., Inc. v. Hitachi, Ltd., No. 99-407, 2005 WL 6054838, at *1 (D. Or.
May 12, 2005).
167 See Translogic, 250 F. App’x at 988.
168 See id.
169 In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
170 Translogic, 250 F. App’x at 988.
171 See id.
172 721 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
173 564 F. App’x 600 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
174 789 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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over a court decision awarding damages for infringement, it could also
require a court to vacate a finding of contempt that was based on an
infringer’s violation of an injunction.
1. Creation
The Federal Circuit first articulated the absolute finality rule in Fresenius.
That case involved several patents owned by Baxter relating to hemodialysis
machines, which are used in place of kidneys to remove toxins from the
blood.175  In 2003, Fresenius, one of Baxter’s competitors, filed suit seeking
declaratory judgments of noninfringement and invalidity of three Baxter pat-
ents.176  Baxter counterclaimed for infringement.177  The jury ruled in
Fresenius’s favor, holding Baxter’s asserted patent claims to be invalid.178
The district court, however, granted Baxter’s motion for judgment as a mat-
ter of law, ruling that Fresenius had not presented sufficient evidence to sup-
port the verdict of invalidity.179  At a subsequent trial on damages, the jury
awarded Baxter $14.266 million for infringement of the three asserted pat-
ents.180  The district court also entered a permanent injunction (which it
stayed to allow Fresenius to develop a noninfringing machine) and awarded
Baxter ongoing post-verdict royalties on Fresenius’s sales of infringing
machines and related products.181
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of judg-
ment as a matter of law to Baxter on its claim of infringement of one patent,
U.S. Patent No. 5,247,434 (the ’434 patent), but reversed the judgment in
Baxter’s favor on the other two patents, holding that the asserted claims were
invalid.182  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit vacated the award of ongoing
royalties and remanded for the district court to reconsider the award in light
of the Federal Circuit’s holdings on validity.183  In addition, the Federal Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court’s decision to permanently enjoin Fresenius,
but it vacated the injunction and remanded so that the district court could
“revise or reconsider the injunction in light of” the holdings on validity.184
Fresenius then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which the Supreme
Court denied.185  At that point, court proceedings on the validity and
infringement of the ’434 patent were effectively concluded in Baxter’s favor.
And Fresenius had not challenged on appeal the amount of the jury’s award
175 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1332.
176 Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 582 F.3d 1288, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 1294.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 1304.
183 Id. at 1303.
184 Id. at 1304.
185 Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 559 U.S. 1070 (2010).
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for past damages.186  So, Baxter’s entitlement to the $14.266 million awarded
by the jury was, as a practical matter, no longer open to dispute.187
While the infringement litigation was pending on remand, the ’434 pat-
ent expired, mooting Baxter’s request for an injunction.188  The district
court eventually entered a final judgment ordering Fresenius to pay Baxter
$14.266 million plus interest in past damages and $9.3 million in post-verdict
royalties, and Fresenius again appealed to the Federal Circuit.189
As Baxter and Fresenius were disputing the infringement case in court,
Baxter was also defending the ’434 patent’s validity at the PTO, where
Fresenius had requested an ex parte reexamination.190  While the infringe-
ment case was pending on remand, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interfer-
ences, the predecessor of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board created by the
America Invents Act, issued a final decision invalidating the claims of the
’434 patent that the courts had found to be infringed.191  Baxter then
appealed to the Federal Circuit, which affirmed the PTO’s decision of inva-
lidity.192  The Federal Circuit acknowledged that, in the prior appeal in the
infringement litigation, it had refused to invalidate the same patent claims
the PTO had invalidated.193  But the Federal Circuit emphasized that the
standard of proving invalidity at the PTO is “a preponderance of the evi-
dence,” which is “substantially lower” than the clear and convincing standard
that applies in district court litigation, and that the PTO’s invalidity decision
was based on prior art references “that were not squarely at issue” in the
litigation.194
About a year after affirming the PTO’s decision holding Baxter’s patent
to be invalid, the Federal Circuit ruled on Fresenius’s appeal from the
remanded district court proceedings.195  A split panel of the court vacated
the entire judgment in Baxter’s favor—including the award of past damages
that the Federal Circuit had previously affirmed.196  Judge Dyk, writing for
the court, began the opinion with an extensive discussion of the reexamina-
tion regime, asserting that, as a general matter, when the PTO invalidates a
186 Fresenius, 582 F.3d at 1294.
187 On remand, Fresenius filed a motion for a new trial on past damages, but the dis-
trict court denied the motion, noting that “Fresenius did not argue at trial or on appeal
that the calculation of past damages depended on the number of patents infringed” and
that, although the Federal Circuit vacated the injunction and post-verdict royalty award,
the Federal Circuit “did not vacate the damages award.”  Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter
Int’l, Inc., No. 03-1431, 2011 WL 2160609, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2011).
188 Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
189 Id. at 1334.
190 Id.
191 See In re Baxter Int’l, Inc., 678 F.3d 1357, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
192 Id. at 1361, 1366.
193 Id. at 1364–65.
194 Id.
195 Fresenius, 721 F.3d 1330.
196 Id.
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patent that is subject to pending litigation, “the patentee’s cause of action is
extinguished and the suit fails.”197
The court then turned to Baxter’s argument that the courts had already
and conclusively decided the issues of validity, infringement, and past dam-
ages and that, accordingly, Fresenius was now barred from relitigating those
issues.198  The court noted that “the cancellation of a patent’s claims cannot
be used to reopen a final damages judgment,” but concluded that proceed-
ings in the infringement case were not sufficiently final to be immune from
the effects of PTO reexamination.199  “Looking to general res judicata princi-
ples governing the preclusive effect of a judgment,” the court wrote, “it is
well-established that where the scope of relief remains to be determined,
there is no final judgment binding the parties (or the court).”200  Because
the Federal Circuit’s decision in the first appeal of the infringement litiga-
tion “left several aspects of the district court’s original judgment unresolved,”
including the amount of ongoing royalties and the scope of the injunction,
the Federal Circuit reasoned that there was no binding final judgment at the
time the PTO invalidated the patent.201  In a footnote, the court cited its
prior unpublished opinion in Translogic, in which the Federal Circuit vacated
a district court judgment of infringement in light of the patent’s subsequent
invalidation in reexamination.202
Judge Newman dissented.  She lamented that the court’s approach
endorsed “tactical gaming and harassment” by potential infringers who can
make multiple attempts to invalidate a single patent.203  She also disagreed
with the majority’s stringent view of finality, noting that the modern doctrine
of issue preclusion treats finality as a “pliant” and “flexible” concept.204  She
catalogued opinions by numerous other federal courts of appeals acknowl-
edging that decisions can be entitled to preclusive effect even if they do not
end the litigation altogether, so long as the parties have had a “full and fair
opportunity to litigate” the relevant issue (here, patent validity).205
When the Federal Circuit denied rehearing en banc, four of the ten
participating judges dissented.  Judge O’Malley, joined by Chief Judge Rader
and Judge Wallach, wrote a forceful opinion criticizing the panel’s “anti-
197 Id. at 1340.
198 Id.
199 Id. at 1340–41.
200 Id. at 1341.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 1344 n.10 (citing Translogic Tech., Inc. v. Hitachi, Ltd., 250 F. App’x 988
(Fed. Cir. 2007)).
203 Id. at 1351 (Newman, J., dissenting).
204 Id. at 1356 (first quoting Henglein v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 260 F.3d 201,
210 (3d Cir. 2001); and then quoting Swentek v. USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 561 (4th Cir.
1987)).
205 Id. at 1355–58 (quoting Employees Own Fed. Credit Union v. City of Defiance, 752
F.2d 243, 254 (6th Cir. 1985)).
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quated view of finality.”206  Since at least the 1960s, she argued, courts have
held orders that establish liability to be final for the purpose of issue preclu-
sion even if matters such as damages remain to be determined.207  Judge
O’Malley also noted that the panel decision “goes a long way toward render-
ing district courts meaningless in the resolution of patent infringement dis-
putes” because courts will inevitably stay proceedings pending reexamination
to avoid having their work nullified by a contrary decision of the PTO.208
Judge Newman dissented separately, expressing concern that the court had
created an “unconstrained free-for-all” that enables “pervasive duplication of
litigation and reexamination of the same patents.”209
2. Consequences
The Federal Circuit’s next case involving conflicting validity decisions
between a court and the PTO, Versata v. SAP,210 illustrates the procedural
free-for-all that worried Judge Newman.  In that case, Versata sued SAP for
infringing several patents on computer software.211  After two trials, the dis-
trict court found one of Versata’s patents to be infringed and rejected SAP’s
arguments that the patent was invalid.212  The court awarded Versata $260
million in lost profits damages and $85 million in reasonable royalties, and it
also entered a permanent injunction.213
In an opinion issued in May 2013, the Federal Circuit affirmed the find-
ing of infringement and the awards of lost profits and reasonable royalties.214
(SAP did not appeal on the issue of validity.215)  The court, however, also
ruled that a portion of the injunction was overbroad and, as in Fresenius,
remanded the case for the district court to modify the injunction.216
While SAP’s appeal had been pending at the Federal Circuit, SAP also
sought review of Versata’s patent in the covered business method review pro-
ceeding created by the America Invents Act.217  In fact, SAP filed its petition
on the very first day the proceeding was available, September 16, 2012.218  In
June 2013, the PTAB ruled that Versata’s patent claims were invalid.219  After
206 Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 733 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(O’Malley, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
207 See id. at 1375–76.
208 Id. at 1372.
209 Id. at 1383 (Newman, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
210 Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 717 F.3d 1255 (Fed Cir. 2013).
211 Id. at 1259.
212 Id. at 1259–60.
213 Id. at 1260.
214 Id. at 1269.
215 See id. at 1260.
216 Id. at 1269.
217 See SAP Am., Inc. v. Versata Dev. Grp., Inc., No. CBM2012-00001, 2013 WL 3167735,
at *1 (P.T.A.B. June 11, 2013).
218 Id.
219 Id. at *20.
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an unsuccessful petition for rehearing,220 Versata appealed the PTAB’s rul-
ing to the Federal Circuit, and the court docketed the appeal on January 3,
2014.221
With conflicting court and PTO rulings on patent validity, the race to
finality was on.  In the district court, Versata tried to speed up final resolution
and protect its damages judgment.  On January 21, 2014, the day the
Supreme Court denied SAP’s petition for a writ of certiorari from the Federal
Circuit’s May 2013 decision in the infringement case,222 Versata abandoned
its request for an injunction, which was the only issue remanded by the Fed-
eral Circuit.  Less than two weeks later, SAP responded by filing a motion
with the district court seeking either a stay of proceedings in light of the
pending Federal Circuit appeal of the PTAB proceeding or, under Rule 60 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a vacatur of the prior damages judg-
ment based on the PTAB’s invalidation of the patent.223
The district court denied the motion for a stay, reasoning that, after the
Federal Circuit affirmed on liability and damages and Versata abandoned its
request for an injunction, the case was complete.224  The court also denied
the motion to vacate the judgment, noting that SAP had “taken advantage of
a full and fair opportunity to litigate the validity of the patent before this
Court, before the jury, and before the Federal Circuit, even pursuing a writ
[of certiorari] to the United States Supreme Court.”225  In language that
seems to question the Federal Circuit’s holding in Fresenius, the court wrote:
To hold that later proceedings before the PTAB can render nugatory that
entire process, and the time and effort of all of the judges and jurors who
have evaluated the evidence and arguments[,] would do a great disservice to
the Seventh Amendment and the entire procedure put in place under Arti-
cle III of the Constitution.226
The court ultimately distinguished Fresenius, noting that the covered bus-
iness method review instigated by SAP was not “final” because the Federal
Circuit had not yet decided Versata’s appeal.227  The court also emphasized
the finality of the infringement case in court, noting that unlike in Fresenius,
where the issue of post-verdict royalties was still pending at the time the Fed-
220 SAP Am., Inc. v. Versata Dev. Grp., Inc., No. CBM2012-00001, 2013 WL 5947675, at
*1 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 13, 2013).
221 Versata, 2013 WL 3167735, at *1, appeal docketed, No. 14-1194 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 3, 2014).
222 SAP Am., Inc. v. Versata Software, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1013 (2014).
223 See Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., No. 2:07cv153, 2014 WL 1600327, at *1
(E.D. Tex. Apr. 21, 2014); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5)–(6) (permitting relief from a
judgment if “it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated,” if
“applying it prospectively is no longer equitable,” or for “any other reason that justifies
relief”).
224 See Versata, 2014 WL 1600327, at *1.
225 Id. at *2.
226 Id.
227 Id.
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eral Circuit affirmed the PTO’s decision, “the judgment in this case is final
and there are no further issues to be resolved.”228
SAP appealed the district court’s order to the Federal Circuit.229  Ver-
sata, again seeking to expedite resolution of the case, filed a motion for sum-
mary affirmance, arguing that SAP was simply trying to prolong the
infringement litigation.230  SAP, for its part, argued that its “appeal is pow-
ered by the compelling logic that a district court should not enter judgment
directing a party to pay $391 million based on a patent that the Patent Office
has finally determined invalid.”231  In a short order that contained no discus-
sion of Fresenius, the Federal Circuit granted Versata’s motion and affirmed
the district court’s judgment, allowing the damages award to stand, notwith-
standing the contrary decision of the PTO.232
The Federal Circuit should not have resolved the Versata case without an
opinion.  The court’s decision to uphold the damages award seems, on first
glance, to be in tension with Fresenius, in which the court overturned an award
of damages for infringement because of the PTO’s subsequent ruling of inva-
lidity.233  Despite the Federal Circuit’s silence, it is possible to reconcile the
two cases by considering the finality of both the PTO proceeding and the
court case.  In Versata, the PTO had invalidated Versata’s patent, but the PTO
proceeding was not entirely concluded because the Federal Circuit had not
yet affirmed the PTO’s decision.234  In Fresenius, by contrast, the PTO pro-
ceeding was entirely concluded at the time the Federal Circuit decided the
second appeal in the infringement litigation (the Federal Circuit had
affirmed the PTO’s decision a year earlier235), so the PTO’s ruling of invalid-
ity provided a sufficiently final basis for overturning the district court’s award
of infringement damages.236
Moreover, the court case in Fresenius, it might be said, was “less final”
than the court case in Versata.  In Fresenius, the appeal in which the Federal
Circuit vacated the judgment of infringement was an appeal from the district
court’s award of post-verdict royalties.  In Versata, by contrast, all issues of
liability and remedy had been resolved when the Federal Circuit affirmed the
district court order denying SAP’s motion to vacate the prior damages judg-
ment.  As the Federal Circuit recently suggested in a slightly different con-
228 Id.
229 See Versata Comput. Indus. Sols., Inc. v. SAP AG, 564 F. App’x 600 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
230 Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Motion to Dismiss or Summarily Affirm at 1, 3, Versata, 564 F.
App’x 600 (No. 2014-1430).
231 Defendants-Appellants’ Response to Motion to Dismiss or Summarily Affirm at 1,
Versata, 564 F. App’x 600 (No. 2014-1430).
232 Versata, 564 F. App’x 600.
233 Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
234 See Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., No. 2:07cv153, 2014 WL 1600327, at *1
(E.D. Tex. Apr. 21, 2014).
235 See supra notes 190–94 and accompanying text.
236 For further discussion of how “final” PTO proceedings must be to justify vacatur of a
court decision, see infra Section II.C.
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text, a court decision on validity becomes immune from reconsideration due
to changed circumstances once all remedial issues have been resolved.237
Doctrine aside, however, the result in Versata could not have been fully
satisfying to either party.  Versata, although it was able to preserve its dam-
ages award, was forced to abandon its request for injunctive relief in order to
expedite finality, even though both the district court and the Federal Circuit
had ruled that Versata was entitled to an injunction.  SAP, on the other hand,
was saddled with a $391 million judgment for infringing a patent that PTO
now believes—and the Federal Circuit has since affirmed238—never should
have been issued.239 Versata thus illustrates the procedural maneuvering that
the absolute finality rule encourages, the difficult strategic decisions the rule
requires, and the seeming arbitrariness that can result when a PTO decision
of invalidity comes just a little too late.
3. Extension
The Federal Circuit’s most recent decision in this line of cases, ePlus v.
Lawson,240 extended the absolute finality rule by allowing an infringer to rely
on a PTO decision of invalidity to abrogate a court order holding the
infringer in contempt.  In that case, ePlus sued Lawson for infringement of
U.S. Patents No. 6,023,683 (the ’683 patent) and 6,505,172 (the ’172 pat-
ent).241  The patents claim methods and systems of using electronic
databases to search for product information and to order products from
third-party vendors.242  The allegedly infringing software sold by Lawson was
modular, meaning that Lawson’s customers could choose to buy particular
software components depending on their needs.243  ePlus alleged infringe-
ment by five different configurations of Lawson’s software, referred to by the
237 See Dow Chem. Co. v. Nova Chems. Corp., 803 F.3d 620, 625 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Dyk,
J.) (holding that the Federal Circuit’s affirmance of a partial final judgment on the issue of
validity did not prevent the court, in a later appeal that raised only damages questions,
from reconsidering the prior ruling on validity under the Supreme Court’s intervening
decision in Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014), which lowered
the legal standard for proving that a patent is invalid as indefinite); see also Dow Chem. Co.
v. Nova. Chems. Corp., 809 F.3d 1223, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (O’Malley, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing, similar to her dissent from the denial of rehearing
en banc in Fresenius, that “[t]he panel could not reopen a validity determination that had
been the subject of a final judgment that was affirmed on appeal”).
238 See Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(affirming the PTAB’s decision to invalidate Versata’s patent).
239 After the Federal Circuit affirmed the denial of SAP’s motion to vacate the prior
damages judgment, the parties settled the infringement dispute. See Stipulation of Dismis-
sal with Prejudice at 1, Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., No. 2:07-cv-153 (E.D. Tex.
Oct. 3, 2014).
240 ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 789 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
241 Id. at 1351.
242 Id.
243 Id. at 1352.
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Federal Circuit as “Configurations 1–5.”244  The jury found that Configura-
tions 3 and 5 infringed both claim 1 of the ’172 patent and claims 3, 26, 28,
and 29 of the ’683 patent and that Configuration 2 infringed claim 1 of the
’172 patent.245  The jury found that Configurations 1 and 4 did not infringe
any of ePlus’s asserted patent claims.246
The Federal Circuit reversed in part, ruling that claim 1 of the ’172 pat-
ent and claim 3 of the ’683 patent were invalid and that claims 28 and 29 of
the ’683 patent were not infringed.247  The Federal Circuit, however,
affirmed the district court’s finding that claim 26 of the ’683 patent was
infringed.248  Because only Configurations 3 and 5 infringed that claim, the
Federal Circuit “remand[ed] for the district court to consider what changes
are required to the terms of the injunction, consistent with this opinion.”249
On remand, the district court deleted from the injunction Configura-
tion 2, which infringed only a patent claim that the Federal Circuit had ruled
to be invalid.250  The court also found Lawson in contempt, ruling that its
redesigned software continued to infringe claim 26 of the ’683 patent.251
The court ordered Lawson to pay a compensatory fine of roughly $18.2 mil-
lion and coercive daily fines of roughly $62,000 until it complied with the
injunction.252  From that contempt order, Lawson again appealed to the Fed-
eral Circuit.
Meanwhile, claim 26 had been undergoing ex parte reexamination at
the PTO in proceedings instituted by SAP, who was a defendant in a previous
infringement suit filed by ePlus.253  The Board of Patent Appeals and Inter-
ferences eventually issued a final decision invalidating claim 26,254 and, while
Lawson’s appeal from the contempt order was pending, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the Board’s decision.255
On Lawson’s appeal from the contempt order, the Federal Circuit panel
unanimously vacated the injunction prospectively because the PTO had inval-
idated the patent claim on which the injunction was based.256  The court
then confronted the sanctions the district court had awarded for Lawson’s
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 700 F.3d 509, 520–22 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
248 Id. at 521.  Lawson did not argue on appeal that claim 26 was invalid. See id. at
517–20.
249 Id. at 523.
250 ePlus, 789 F.3d at 1353.
251 ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 2d 472, 490–92 (E.D. Va. 2013).
252 ePlus, 789 F.3d at 1354.
253 Ex parte ePlus, Inc., No. 2010-007804, 2011 WL 1918594, at *1 (B.P.A.I. May 18,
2011).
254 See Ex parte ePlus, Inc., No. 2010-007804, 2012 WL 1050566, at *1 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 23,
2012).
255 In re ePlus, Inc., 540 F. App’x 998 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
256 ePlus, 789 F.3d at 1354–56 (citing Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co.,
54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 577–79 (1851)).
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past violations of the injunction, that is, for the violations that occurred
before the PTO invalidated the patent in reexamination.  The majority
(Judge Dyk, joined by Chief Judge Prost) relied on Fresenius to vacate the
sanctions order.257  In Fresenius, the court explained, “We held . . . that even
if this court has rejected an invalidity defense to infringement, an ‘interven-
ing decision invalidating the patents unquestionably applies’ as long as ‘the
judgment in [the infringement case] is not final.’”258  As to finality, the court
explained that “where the scope of relief remains to be determined, there is
no final judgment.”259  In the court’s view, its remand in the first appeal
meant that the propriety of an injunction was still an open question at the
time the PTO invalidated claim 26.260  Thus, over the dissent of Judge
O’Malley, the court held that Fresenius mandated vacatur of the sanctions
award.261
The Federal Circuit denied ePlus’s petition for rehearing en banc by a
vote of five to five, one vote shy of the majority needed to grant review.262
Three judges wrote dissenting opinions, including Judge Newman, who again
argued that the absolute finality rule conflicts with the law in other circuits
that a ruling on liability is entitled to preclusive effect on that issue,263 and
Judge O’Malley who similarly cited the need “to reevalute our finality
jurisprudence.”264
Judge Moore wrote a provocative dissent focusing in part on the incen-
tives created by the absolute finality rule, noting that it “encourages defend-
ants to scrap and fight to keep underlying litigation pending in the hope that
they will fare better with the PTO and then be able to unravel the district
court judgment against them.”265  She also highlighted broader concerns
about parallel review of patent validity, writing:
[T]here are problems with a system which permits defendants to snatch vic-
tory from the already closed jaws of defeat.  Whether these problems are to
be resolved by the Supreme Court through its precedent on finality or
through Congress, this sort of gamesmanship ought to be curtailed.  I have
257 Id. at 1358.
258 Id. (quoting Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1344 (Fed. Cir.
2013)).
259 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1341).
260 Id. at 1361.
261 Id. at 1362. In dissent, Judge O’Malley argued that Fresenius was distinguishable
from the case at hand because, among other things, ePlus, the patent holder, never
appealed the Federal Circuit’s ruling on the validity of the infringed patent claim (claim
26). Id. at 1367 (O’Malley, J., dissenting).  Also, reiterating views expressed in her dissent
from the denial of rehearing en banc in Fresenius, she argued that the absolute finality rule
is “contrary to the well-established law of finality.” Id. at 1370.
262 ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 790 F.3d 1307, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
263 Id. at 1311 (Newman, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (citing Zda-
nok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 955 (2d Cir. 1964)).
264 Id. at 1315 (O’Malley, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
265 Id. at 1314 (Moore, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (footnote
omitted).
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no problem with the dual track system Congress has created, but for at least
a subset of cases, defendants are abusing the process by doing both.  This is
wasteful of judicial, executive, and party resources, and it is just plain unfair.
Congress intended [post-issuance review] to be an alternative to district
court litigation of certain validity issues, not duplicative of them.266
With the Federal Circuit’s denial of rehearing in ePlus, and the Supreme
Court’s denial of certiorari,267 the absolute finality rule is now indisputably
the law.  Yet the sharp disagreements among the Federal Circuit’s judges sug-
gest that the issue is far from settled.  Consequently, this Article’s next task is
to provide a close analysis of the rationale for and consequences of the abso-
lute finality rule.
C. How Final Is Final?
The first question in that analysis involves the meaning of the absolute
finality rule itself.  For a PTO decision to be sufficiently final to provide
grounds for vacating a court decision, it seems that all proceedings at the
PTO, plus any judicial review of those proceedings, must be concluded.
Although the Federal Circuit has not explicitly stated that rule, in Fresenius
the court wrote that “the [reexamination] statute requires that a final PTO
decision affirmed by this court be given effect in pending infringement cases
that are not yet final.”268  District courts have accordingly interpreted
Fresenius as requiring judgment in favor of the accused infringer only once
the PTO’s decision has been affirmed by the Federal Circuit.269  Moreover,
in a recent case between smartphone behemoths Apple and Samsung, the
Federal Circuit affirmed a $548 million judgment in favor of Apple even
though the PTAB had already determined—in a decision that had not yet
been reviewed by the Federal Circuit—that one of the infringed patents was
invalid.270  As a matter of statutory interpretation, it makes sense that PTO
proceedings would be considered final only upon the conclusion of any
appeal to the Federal Circuit.  The statutes governing post-issuance review
require the PTO to issue its certificate canceling patent claims determined to
266 Id. at 1315.
267 ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016).
268 Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(emphasis added).
269 E.g., Athenahealth, Inc. v. Carecloud Corp., No. 13-cv-10794-IT, slip op. at 1 (D.
Mass. Jan. 21, 2016); accord WesternGeco, LLC v. Ion Geophysical Corp., No. 4:09-CV-1827,
slip. op. at 24–25 (S.D. Tex. May 4, 2016) (magistrate judge recommending the denial of a
motion to vacate a judgment of infringement where the PTAB’s decision of invalidity had
not yet been reviewed by the Federal Circuit).
270 Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 786 F.3d 983, 989 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted in
part, 136 S. Ct. 1454 (2016); see also Ex parte Apple, Inc., Appeal No. 2014-007899, 2015 WL
5676869, at *1, *4 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 24, 2015) (denying rehearing and recounting procedu-
ral history).
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be unpatentable only “when the time for appeal has expired or any appeal
proceeding has terminated.”271
For a court decision to be sufficiently final to avoid vacatur due to a PTO
decision of invalidity, the Federal Circuit has suggested, as noted above, that
the “scope of relief” must be resolved.272  Although the court has not
expressly stated what it means for the scope of relief to be resolved, its deci-
sions provide important clues.  In cases involving only damages, finality
seems to occur when all proceedings regarding entitlement to and amount of
damages, including direct appeals from those proceedings, are concluded.273
If the scope of relief has been resolved, a subsequent PTO ruling of invalidity
will not provide the infringer with a basis for avoiding payment of damages
pursuant to the judgment.  As discussed in more detail below, separation of
powers almost certainly prohibits the action of an administrative agency, such
as the PTO, from serving as a basis for reopening a litigation-ending judg-
ment awarding damages.274
In the injunction context, one might reasonably observe that the “scope
of relief” is never definitively resolved because courts always have the power
to revise injunctions in light of changed circumstances.275  Indeed, the Fed-
eral Circuit has squarely held that the invalidation of a patent justifies the
prospective vacatur of any injunction against infringement of that patent.276
271 35 U.S.C. § 307(a) (2012) (ex parte reexamination statute); see also id. §§ 318(b),
328(b) (provisions governing post-issuance proceedings created by the AIA, using similar
language).  For the purpose of issuing a cancelation certificate, it appears the PTO does
not consider appeal proceedings terminated until there is no possibility of Supreme Court
review on certiorari. See Letter from Thomas W. Krause, Acting Solicitor, U.S. Pat. &
Trademark Off., to Joel G. MacMull, Archer & Greiner P.C. (Mar. 11, 2016), http://assets
.law360news.com/0771000/771166/letter%20re%203-8-16%20submission%20to%20ttab
%20in%20tam.docx.pdf, which explains the PTO’s refusal to conduct further proceedings
on a trademark application after the Federal Circuit’s mandated decision in In re Tam, 808
F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (holding the Lanham Act’s bar on the registration of
disparaging marks to be unconstitutional), cert. granted sub nom. Lee v. Tam, 2016 WL
1587871 (U.S. Sept. 29, 2016) (No. 15-1293).  The letter states that “[c]onsistent with
USPTO practice following a Federal Circuit decision . . . there will be no ‘further proceed-
ings’ . . . until the last of the following occurs: (1) the period to petition for a writ of
certiorari . . . expires . . . ; (2) a petition for certiorari is denied; or (3) certiorari is granted
and the U.S. Supreme Court issues a decision.” Id.; accord U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
EXAM GUIDE 01-16: EXAMINATION FOR COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 2(A)’S SCANDALOUSNESS
AND DISPARAGEMENT PROVISIONS WHILE CONSTITUTIONALITY REMAINS IN QUESTION 1 (2016),
http://www.uspto.gov/trademark/guides-and-manuals/trademark-examination-guides.
272 ePlus v. Lawson, 789 F.3d 1349, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1341).
273 See supra subsection II.B.2 (comparing the finality of damages proceedings in
Fresenius and Versata).
274 See infra Section III.A (discussing Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211
(1995)).
275 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 2961.
276 See DeLorme Publ’g Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 805 F.3d 1328, 1336 (Fed. Cir.
2015), petition for cert. filed sub nom. DBN Holding, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 2016 WL
3752587 (U.S. July 13, 2016) (No. 16-63).
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One might invoke the court’s ongoing power to alter injunctions to assert,
similarly, that an order imposing sanctions for past violations of an injunction
can also be vacated if the PTO invalidates the underlying patent, even if the
terms of the injunction had already been definitively resolved.277  In a recent
case involving proceedings both in court and at the International Trade
Commission, however, the Federal Circuit ruled that an order imposing sanc-
tions cannot be vacated based on a subsequent ruling of invalidity unless—as
was the case in ePlus—the injunction that provided the basis for sanctions is
still subject to review on a direct appeal.278
To summarize: Federal Circuit law creates, essentially, a race to the fin-
ish.  If a court decision awarding damages for infringement is contained in a
final, litigation-ending judgment, that decision will be unaffected by any sub-
sequent PTO decision of invalidity.  Similarly, a court decision awarding con-
tempt sanctions for violation of an injunction against infringement will be
unaffected by any subsequent PTO decision of invalidity, so long as the
injunction has merged into a final, litigation-ending judgment.  Conversely, a
PTO decision of invalidity that has been affirmed by the Federal Circuit will
justify vacatur of any court decision awarding damages or imposing contempt
sanctions, so long as the damage award or underlying injunction has not
merged into a final, litigation-ending judgment.  Although this absolute final-
ity rule provides a relatively clear, bright-line test, the rule also has several
potentially harmful consequences, as discussed next.
277 See ePlus, 789 F.3d at 1370–71 (O’Malley, J., dissenting).
278 See DeLorme, 805 F.3d at 1336 (refusing to vacate a contempt sanction based on a
violation of a consent order in which the accused infringer had agreed to refrain from
importing infringing products, even though a court later invalidated the underlying pat-
ent, noting that because “[t]he Consent Order was final and no longer subject to review at
the time of the violation, . . . we cannot set aside the penalty for that violation” (citing
ePlus, 789 F.3d at 1358)).  Whether proceedings at the Supreme Court on certiorari must
also be concluded as a prerequisite to the finality of court proceedings is unclear.
Although the PTO seems to view proceedings at the Office as not final until all options for
appellate review—including by the Supreme Court on certiorari—are exhausted, see supra
note 271, some Federal Circuit caselaw suggests that court proceedings become final—and
therefore immune from the effects of PTO review—upon the affirmance of the district
court’s judgment by a Federal Circuit panel, even if the time for seeking rehearing or
certiorari has not yet run.  In Cardpool, Inc. v. Plastic Jungle, Inc., 817 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir.
2016), for instance, the Federal Circuit refused to vacate a court decision of invalidity on
the ground that the patent’s claims had been amended in reexamination because a Fed-
eral Circuit panel had affirmed the decision of invalidity before the PTO issued its reexam-
ination certificate. Id. at 1324.  The patent holder, however, had filed a petition for
rehearing en banc after the PTO issued the reexamination certificate, and the time for
seeking certiorari had not even begun to run. Id. at 1319.  Yet the Federal Circuit deemed
the panel decision on validity to be “final” and immune from the effects of PTO reexami-
nation. Id. at 1324.
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III. RETHINKING THE ABSOLUTE FINALITY RULE
Among other things, the absolute finality rule encourages wasteful pro-
cedural maneuvering, allows an adjudged infringer a second chance at prov-
ing invalidity, and threatens separation of powers by permitting an
administrative agency to effectively nullify court judgments.  Consequently,
the merits of the absolute finality rule deserve close scrutiny.  This Part pro-
vides that normative analysis.  It begins by discussing the separation of powers
concerns raised by the absolute finality rule and critiquing, from a doctrinal
perspective, the Federal Circuit decisions embracing that rule.  It then evalu-
ates the rule from a policy perspective and considers alternative ways courts
could resolve or avoid conflicts with the PTO.
A. Separation of Powers
The absolute finality rule does not necessarily violate Supreme Court
caselaw on separation of powers, despite arguments to the contrary by at least
one Federal Circuit judge.279  But because the rule allows a PTO decision to
alter a decision by an Article III court, separation of powers concerns cannot
be ignored and provide a good starting point for a normative analysis.
Separation of powers doctrine prohibits the branches of the federal gov-
ernment from “encroaching on the central prerogatives” of one another.280
Because, under Article III, the federal courts alone possess “[t]he judicial
Power of the United States,”281 the Supreme Court has held that final judg-
ments of Article III courts cannot be overturned by other branches of govern-
ment.  In Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,282 for instance, the Supreme Court
held unconstitutional a federal statute that attempted to reinstate securities
fraud claims that a federal district court had previously held to be time
barred.  The Court reasoned that Article III “gives the Federal Judiciary the
power, not merely to rule on cases, but to decide them, subject to review only
by superior courts in the Article III hierarchy.”283  In a parallel line of cases
dating back to the eighteenth century, the Supreme Court has confirmed
that officials in the executive branch (which includes the PTO) may not
review on appeal the decisions of Article III courts.  In Hayburn’s Case, for
example, the Court indicated that Congress could not authorize the federal
courts to determine whether Revolutionary War veterans were eligible for a
279 See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1348–53 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(Newman, J., dissenting); see also Daniel Sutter, Note, Leaving the Fox in the Henhouse: ePlus
v. Lawson Software, Inc. and the Court’s Submission to the Executive Branch, 25 FED. CIR. B.J.
489, 493 (2016) (arguing that the Federal Circuit’s decision in ePlus violated the separation
of powers).
280 Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 341 (2000) (citing Loving v. United States, 517 U.S.
748, 757 (1996)).
281 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
282 514 U.S. 211, 240 (1995).
283 Id. at 218–19.
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federal pension when, under the pension statute, those determinations were
subject to review by the Secretary of War.284
In contrast to the prohibition on Congress and the executive branch
reviewing or altering the final decisions of Article III courts, the Supreme
Court has allowed Congress to prospectively modify the effect of injunctions
issued by the federal courts.  In Miller v. French, for instance, the Court
upheld the constitutionality of a provision of the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA) that automatically stayed a previously entered injunction upon
the defendant’s filing of a motion to terminate that injunction.285  In distin-
guishing Plaut, which struck down a statute reinstating previously dismissed
securities fraud claims,286 the Court emphasized a distinction between
injunctions and judgments in suits seeking money damages.287  Legislative
reopening of a judgment in a suit seeking damages is not permissible, the
Court explained, because that judgment is the “last word of the judicial
department.”288  Legislative alteration of injunctions, by contrast, is permissi-
ble because there has been no “final” court decision—a court always retains
authority to modify an injunction.289
Although the Federal Circuit’s recent decisions in Fresenius and ePlus
could be characterized as allowing the executive branch to impermissibly
overturn a court judgment in a lawsuit seeking damages,290 those Federal
Circuit decisions can be distinguished from the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Plaut and Hayburn’s Case, which disapproved of statutes on separation of pow-
ers grounds.  In Plaut, Congress sought to overturn a final, litigation-ending
judgment entered by a district court.  By contrast, in Federal Circuit cases
such as Fresenius and ePlus, the district court had not entered a litigation-
ending judgment at the time the PTO post-issuance proceedings concluded.
Indeed, if the district court had entered such a judgment, that judgment,
under the Federal Circuit’s absolute finality rule, would have taken prece-
dence.291  The absolute finality rule is also consistent with Hayburn’s Case and
the bar on executive review of judicial decisions.  In post-issuance review, the
284 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 (1792); see also Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S.
Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113–14 (1948) (“It has . . . been the firm and unvarying practice of
Constitutional Courts to render no judgments not binding and conclusive on the parties
and none that are subject to later review or alteration by administrative action.”) (citing
Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409).
285 530 U.S. at 333–34, 350.
286 Plaut, 514 U.S. at 214–15, 240.
287 Miller, 530 U.S. at 347.
288 Id. at 344 (quoting Plaut, 514 U.S. at 227 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
289 Id. at 347; see also supra note 277 and accompanying text.
290 See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(Newman, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen the issue of validity of the claims has already been
resolved in litigation, subsequent redetermination by the PTO is directly violative of the
structure of government.”).
291 Cf. id. at 1346 (majority opinion) (“There is no basis to read Plaut to impose restric-
tions on reopening before there has been a final judgment ending the case . . . .” (emphasis
added)).
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PTO is not reviewing a court’s decision on patent validity, it is reconsidering
its own decision to issue the patent.292
Yet Miller, which upheld the automatic stay provision of the PLRA even
though the stay altered the effect of a judgment entered by an Article III
court, also does not provide definitive support for the Federal Circuit’s abso-
lute finality rule.  The Court in Miller approved of legislation altering the
scope of prospective injunctive relief but, in both Fresenius and ePlus, the
PTO’s invalidity decisions had the effect of wiping out court awards of retro-
spective monetary relief.  The distinction between injunctions and damages
was critical to the Court’s reasoning in Miller, in which the Court acknowl-
edged that, as illustrated by Plaut, the political branches may not reopen
court judgments in lawsuits seeking damages.293
In short, all of the patent cases recently confronted by the Federal Cir-
cuit can be distinguished from the Supreme Court’s leading decisions on
separation of powers.  Yet the absolute finality rule, which grants precedence
to PTO decisions of invalidity despite court rulings rejecting challenges to
patent validity, remains in tension with the basic policy that the federal courts
should have the last word on cases within their jurisdiction.294  This underly-
ing tension provides a reason to at least be skeptical of the Federal Circuit’s
approach, even if it cannot definitively be said that the court’s approach is
unconstitutional.
B. Doctrinal Reassessment
Another reason to be skeptical of the Federal Circuit’s absolute finality
rule is that the rule is based on several authorities that, contrary to the court’s
contentions, do not clearly indicate how to resolve conflicting decisions
between a court and the PTO in concurrent proceedings.
292 Cf. Miller, 530 U.S. at 343 (upholding the automatic stay provision of the PLRA,
noting that “[u]nlike the situation in Hayburn’s Case, [the PLRA] does not involve the
direct review of a judicial decision by officials of the Legislative or Executive Branches”).
The fact that the PTO (or the Federal Circuit, when it is reviewing the PTO’s decision) is
not directly reviewing the prior court ruling also probably ensures that the absolute finality
rule is consistent with the Seventh Amendment’s reexamination clause. See U.S. CONST.
amend. VII (“In Suits at common law . . . the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and
no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States,
than according to the rules of the common law.”); see also MCM Portfolio, LLC v. Hewlett-
Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, No. 15-1330, 2016
WL1724103 (U.S. Oct. 11, 2016) (holding that inter partes review does not violate the
Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury).
293 Miller, 530 U.S. at 344.
294 That said, even in cases such as Fresenius, where a court decision is vacated because
of a PTO ruling, one might say that the courts did, in fact, get the last word—they dis-
missed the case as moot. See Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1347.  But that mootness dismissal was,
of course, premised entirely on the PTO’s antecedent ruling of invalidity. See id.
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1. The Basis of the Absolute Finality Rule
In holding that a PTO decision of invalidity takes precedence over a
court decision rejecting a validity challenge, the Federal Circuit has relied
heavily on prior decisions involving inconsistent validity rulings by two courts.
For instance, the Federal Circuit in Fresenius analogized to its prior decision
in Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co.295  In Mendenhall, the Federal Circuit held
that a jury verdict of patent invalidity was entitled to issue preclusive effect in
another pending court case, even though, in that pending case, the Federal
Circuit had already affirmed a judge’s validity decision favoring the patent
holder, entered after a bench trial.296  (To justify its own conflicting rulings,
the Federal Circuit emphasized the deferential standard of appellate review
for findings of fact and the different identities of the fact finders in the two
cases.297)  The Federal Circuit in Mendenhall, as in Fresenius, reasoned that
there was no “final judgment” in the pending case in which the judge had
ruled in the patent holder’s favor on the issue of validity because, despite the
Federal Circuit’s affirmance of the judge’s decision, there were matters
related to damages still to be resolved.298
The requirements of issue preclusion were clearly met in Mendenhall: the
contested issue in both proceedings (patent validity) was identical and the
patent holder had a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in the case
in which the jury found the patent to be invalid.299  In cases involving con-
current proceedings in the courts and at the PTO, by contrast, a critical ele-
ment of issue preclusion is missing because the PTO applies a lower standard
of proof than the courts on the question of patent validity.  The Restatement
(Second) of Judgments, for instance, flatly states that preclusion is not appropri-
ate when the party seeking to invoke preclusion “has a significantly heavier
burden than he had in the [prior] action,”300 which is precisely the case
when an accused infringer seeks to rely in court on an invalidity determina-
tion by the PTO under the preponderance of the evidence standard, because
in court the accused infringer must prove invalidity by clear and convincing
evidence.  The Federal Circuit has recognized that failure to carry the clear
295 See id. at 1343–44 (citing Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 26 F.3d 1573, 1580–81
(Fed. Cir. 1994)).
296 Mendenhall, 26 F.3d at 1576.
297 See Mendenhall v. Cedarapids, Inc., 5 F.3d 1557, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
298 Mendenhall, 26 F.3d at 1576.
299 In addition, patent validity was actually litigated and necessary to—indeed, essential
to—the judgment in that case.  On the elements of issue preclusion, see generally Levi
Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 719 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(“We have stated four preconditions for a second suit to be barred by issue preclusion: (1)
identity of the issues in a prior proceeding; (2) the issues were actually litigated; (3) the
determination of the issues was necessary to the resulting judgment; and (4) the party
defending against preclusion had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues.”).
300 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(4) (AM. LAW INST. 1982); accord WRIGHT
ET AL., supra note 20, § 4422 (“[A] party who has carried the burden of establishing an
issue by a preponderance of the evidence is not entitled to assert preclusion in a later
action that requires proof of the same issue by a higher standard.”).
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and convincing standard in court does not preclude a later challenge to
validity at the PTO due to the lower burden of proof at the PTO.301  But in
cases such as Fresenius, the court has not recognized the corollary to that
principle: a PTO ruling finding invalidity by a preponderance of the evi-
dence does not—as a matter of preclusion law—bind the patent holder in a
later court proceeding requiring clear and convincing evidence.
Even if the requirements of issue preclusion are not satisfied, however,
no one disputes that, as a general matter, the PTO’s decision to invalidate a
patent prohibits the patent holder from pursuing claims of infringement in
the future.302  But that prohibition does not arise from the common law doc-
trines of preclusion at issue in Mendenhall.  As noted above, under the stat-
utes authorizing post-issuance review, the PTO, once it concludes that a
claim is unpatentable and proceedings have concluded, issues a cancelation
certificate that has the legal effect of rescinding the relevant patent rights.303
It is that act of cancelation—not issue preclusion doctrine—that bars the
claim of infringement.  Thus, Mendenhall, which approves of issue preclusion
in parallel court proceedings, does not resolve the key question in a case
such as Fresenius: Does the PTO’s issuance of a cancelation certificate mean
that courts must vacate a definitive decision on validity?
The Federal Circuit in Fresenius, although it drew on Mendenhall and the
common law of preclusion as the basis for the absolute finality rule, acknowl-
edged the importance of the PTO’s act of cancelation, noting that it “extin-
guishes the underlying basis for suits based on the patent” and that,
therefore, any pending suit must be dismissed.304  To support the notion that
pending suits must be dismissed, the Federal Circuit cited the Supreme
Court’s 1861 decision in Moffitt v. Garr, which held that the plaintiff’s surren-
der of a patent to the PTO required dismissal of a pending suit for infringe-
ment.305  The Court in Moffitt noted that patent infringement suits “depend
upon the patent existing at the time they were commenced, and unless it
exists, and is in force at the time of trial and judgment, the suits fail.”306  This
statement suggesting that the patent must be in force at the time of the court’s
judgment is the best support for the absolute finality rule that can be found in
Supreme Court caselaw.  Yet the statement is clearly dicta, for the lower court
in Moffitt never entered judgment on the merits of the infringement
claim.307  Rather, the patent holder surrendered his patent less than two
months after commencing suit.308  In short, Moffitt also does not definitively
301 Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1427–29 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
302 See, e.g., Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1340 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (“Baxter wisely agrees that in general, when a claim is cancelled, the patentee loses
any cause of action based on that claim . . . .”).
303 See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
304 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1338, 1344.
305 66 U.S. 273, 282–83 (1861).
306 Id. at 283.
307 See id. at 273–74.
308 Id.
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answer the question of whether the PTO’s invalidation of a patent mandates
dismissal when a court has already resolved the issue of validity.
In answering that question, the Federal Circuit has also analogized to
the Supreme Court’s 1922 decision in Simmons Co. v. Grier Bros.309 but that
analogy is likewise unavailing because of numerous changes in patent law,
appellate procedure, and preclusion law over the past one hundred years.  In
Simmons, the Third Circuit, in an appeal from an infringement case in the
Western District of Pennsylvania, held a patent owned by Simmons to be inva-
lid.310  But the Supreme Court, in an appeal from a subsequent infringement
case filed by Simmons in the Southern District of New York, rejected the
defendant’s challenge to patent validity and held the patent to be
infringed.311  After that Supreme Court decision, Simmons sought to reopen
infringement proceedings in Pennsylvania.312  The Third Circuit held that
Simmons could not reopen the proceedings, but the Supreme Court
reversed.313  The Court emphasized that the Third Circuit’s original holding
of invalidity “did not bring the suit to a conclusion” because a special master
had yet to calculate damages on an unfair competition claim that Simmons
had joined with its patent infringement claim, noting that “there can be but
one final decree in a suit in equity.”314
It is a stretch to claim, as the Federal Circuit has, that Simmons is control-
ling in modern cases involving inconsistent validity decisions by a court and
the PTO.315  To begin with, claims seeking damages for patent infringement
no longer proceed in equity, and today it is not unusual to have more than
one “final” judgment in a case.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) allows
a court to enter judgment on fewer than all of the claims in a case if there is
no just reason for delay.316  In patent cases specifically, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(c)(2) grants the Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction over patent
infringement judgments that are “final except for an accounting,”317 mean-
ing that, in those cases, there will essentially be two final judgments, one
309 See Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1342 (citing Simmons Co. v. Grier Bros., 258 U.S. 82
(1922)).
310 Simmons, 258 U.S. at 83–84.
311 Id. at 84–85.
312 Id. at 85.
313 Id. at 88, 92.
314 Id. at 89.
315 See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 733 F.3d 1369, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(Dyk, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (“If we were to hold that our judg-
ment in Fresenius . . . is immune to a subsequent adjudication of invalidity, we would con-
travene controlling Supreme Court authority in Simmons . . . .”).
316 FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b) (“When an action presents more than one claim for relief . . .
or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to
one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines
that there is no just reason for delay.”).
317 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(2) (2012).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-1\NDL106.txt unknown Seq: 44 30-NOV-16 11:40
314 notre dame law review [vol. 92:1
determining liability for infringement and another setting the amount of
damages.318
Moreover, when the Supreme Court decided Simmons, decisions that did
not fully resolve a case, such as the Third Circuit’s ruling of invalidity, were
usually not entitled to preclusive effect until the case concluded.319  The
Court in Simmons did not base its holding on preclusion doctrine, but, given
the stringent finality requirement that prevailed at the time, it is not surpris-
ing that the Court viewed the Third Circuit’s interlocutory ruling of invalidity
to be insufficiently conclusive to avoid the effect of the Court’s subsequent
ruling in favor of the patent holder.  Today, by contrast, the Third Circuit’s
decision that the patent was invalid would likely be considered final for pre-
clusion purposes because it definitively resolved that issue as between the
parties to the case, even if other issues remained to be decided.320  Indeed,
Simmons’s second suit for infringement, after the Third Circuit’s finding of
invalidity, would almost certainly be precluded today under Blonder-Tongue,
which held that a court decision of invalidity precludes all future claims for
infringement.321
In short, it is not at all clear that Simmons would be decided the same way
today, so the Federal Circuit’s suggestion that the case is “controlling . . .
authority” is questionable.322  But we may never know how Simmons would be
decided today because the creation of the Federal Circuit makes it unlikely
that the case’s fact pattern—conflicting decisions by two federal courts of
appeal on the validity of the same patent—will ever recur.
2. Issue Preclusion Finality
To summarize the argument thus far: none of the authorities on which
the Federal Circuit has relied provide lock-tight support for its holding that,
so long as any issue remains to be determined in a court case, a PTO decision
of invalidity takes precedence over a court decision rejecting a validity chal-
lenge.  In several dissenting opinions, Judges Newman and O’Malley have
identified a doctrine they believe conclusively shows that the absolute finality
rule is wrong.  Specifically, they have argued that caselaw discussing the final-
ity requirement of issue preclusion doctrine answers the question of when a
court decision is immune from the effects of a PTO decision of invalidity.323
Although the Federal Circuit’s absolute finality rule is certainly in tension
with the flexible notions of finality that prevail under modern preclusion
318 See, e.g., Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 719 F.3d 1305, 1308 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (en banc).
319 See 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 4432.
320 See infra subsection III.B.2.
321 Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
322 Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 733 F.3d 1369, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Dyk,
J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc).
323 See, e.g., Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (Newman, J., dissenting); Fresenius, 733 F.3d at 1375–76 (O’Malley, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc).
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doctrine, issue preclusion principles also do not definitively indicate how to
mediate conflicting decisions between a court and the PTO on the validity of
a single patent.
To be sure, Judges Newman and O’Malley are correct about the content
of modern preclusion doctrine.  Traditionally, finality for issue preclusion
purposes was similar to the finality required for a judgment to be appeala-
ble.324  The order had to end the litigation on the merits and leave nothing
for the court to do but execute the judgment.325  Thus, in Fresenius, the
majority was able to claim that “[a]n order that establishes liability but leaves
open the question of damages or other remedies . . . [is] not final for pur-
poses of preclusion under traditional analysis.”326
Today, however, finality is typically applied “less strictly for preclusion
purposes than for purposes of appeal.”327  The leading case drawing this dis-
tinction is Judge Friendly’s opinion for the Second Circuit in Lummus Co. v.
Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., which noted:
Whether a judgment, not “final” in the sense of [being appealable], ought
nevertheless be considered “final” in the sense of precluding further litiga-
tion of the same issue, turns upon such factors as the nature of the decision
(i.e., that it was not avowedly tentative), the adequacy of the hearing, and
the opportunity for review.  “Finality” in the context here relevant may mean
little more than that the litigation of a particular issue has reached such a
stage that a court sees no really good reason for permitting it to be litigated
again.328
Accordingly, an order that definitively establishes liability but leaves
unresolved remedial questions, such as the amount of damages or the precise
terms of an injunction, is usually entitled to preclusive effect on the issue of
liability, even though the case is still ongoing.329
Under this modern, flexible conception of finality, the district court rul-
ings on validity and infringement that the Federal Circuit overturned in
Fresenius and ePlus were, as Judges Newman and O’Malley argued, final for
preclusion purposes before the PTO proceedings concluded.  In Fresenius,
the court proceedings on validity and infringement effectively concluded
when the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling in favor of Bax-
ter (the patent holder) on those issues and the Supreme Court denied certio-
rari from that ruling.  Although the Federal Circuit remanded for further
proceedings related to ongoing royalties and the injunction, for issue preclu-
324 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 4432.
325 Id.
326 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1341–42 (second and third alterations in original) (some
emphasis omitted) (quoting 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 4432 (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
327 Fresenius, 733 F.3d at 1380 (O’Malley, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc) (emphasis omitted).
328 297 F.2d 80, 89 (2d Cir. 1961); accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13
(AM. LAW INST. 1982).
329 See, e.g., Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 955 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.); see
generally 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, at § 4434 (citing cases).
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sion purposes, the court rulings on validity and infringement were final more
than two years before the Federal Circuit affirmed the PTO decision invali-
dating Baxter’s patent claims.330  Likewise, in ePlus, validity and infringement
were resolved in the first appeal, which concluded ten months before the
Federal Circuit affirmed the PTO’s invalidity decision.331
Issue preclusion, however, is not the relevant doctrine in cases involving
conflicting decisions between the courts and the PTO.  As noted, the courts
and the PTO apply different burdens of proof on the issue of validity, which
defeats a key requirement for issue preclusion.332  Moreover, the finality
requirement for issue preclusion ensures that the decision to be given preclusive
effect is sufficiently conclusive to forestall relitigation.  In cases such as
Fresenius and ePlus, however, the Federal Circuit’s finality analysis has focused
on the court’s decision in infringement litigation, which does not forestall
proceedings in the PTO.  Indeed, it is relatively uncontroversial that the PTO
can continue post-issuance review even after a court rejects a validity chal-
lenge.333  (This is because, as noted above, a court decision rejecting a valid-
ity challenge is binding only on the parties to the case, whereas a decision of
invalidity—whether by the court or the PTO—is binding against the entire
world.334)  If any decision could be characterized as being given “preclusive”
effect in cases such as Fresenius and ePlus, it is the PTO’s decision to invalidate
the patent, which forestalls continued litigation of the infringement claims in
court.  But because the court decision is not being assessed for its preclusive
effect, the fact that it is final for issue preclusion purposes does not establish
that it should take precedence over a PTO decision, contrary to what Judges
Newman and O’Malley have argued.
That said, the fact that a court decision is final for the purpose of preclu-
sion among the courts illustrates how the absolute finality rule threatens sep-
330 See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 559 U.S. 1070 (2010); In re Baxter Int’l,
Inc., 678 F.3d 1357, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  It should be noted that the issues of validity and
infringement could, in theory, have been considered by the Supreme Court if it had
granted certiorari in a subsequent appeal in the infringement case. See Amcast Indus.
Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 45 F.3d 155, 160 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J.) (noting that the
denial of certiorari from a decision that does not conclude the litigation “does not pre-
clude a grant of certiorari to review the identical issue at a later stage in the case”).  In
Baxter’s case, however, that contingency was extremely unlikely because Fresenius had
already petitioned the Court to review the Federal Circuit’s rulings on validity and infringe-
ment, and the Court denied that petition. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
Moreover, even though the Supreme Court has the ability to reconsider issues long since
resolved by the lower courts, the lower courts’ rulings remain final for preclusion purposes
unless and until that happens. See Amcast, 45 F.3d at 160.
331 See In re ePlus, Inc., 540 F. App’x 998 (Fed. Cir. 2013); ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson
Software, Inc., 700 F.3d 509 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
332 See supra subsection III.B.1.
333 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.  Judge Newman has been a noted skeptic
of this rule. See In re Constr. Equip. Co., 665 F.3d 1254, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Newman, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that “a patent that has been held valid or invalid in court” should not
be subject to reexamination in the PTO).
334 See supra notes 43–48 and accompanying text.
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aration of powers—the rule allows the PTO to alter a decision that would
otherwise be binding between the parties in all courts nationwide.  Moreover,
the basic policies of efficiency and repose that undergird preclusion doctrine
support the suggestion by Judges Newman and O’Malley that the absolute
finality rule is too inflexible.335  Infringement defendants such as Fresenius
and Lawson had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues of validity
and infringement, all the way through appeal.  And they lost.  But issue pre-
clusion doctrine does not itself resolve whether a court ruling rejecting a
validity challenge should stand despite the PTO’s conclusion that the patent
is invalid.
3. Law of the Case
Unlike the cases on which the Federal Circuit’s majority opinions have
relied and unlike the issue preclusion doctrine invoked by Judges Newman
and O’Malley, the doctrine of law of the case addresses the precise question
with which the Federal Circuit has struggled in its recent decisions: Should a
court reconsider a prior ruling in light of an intervening event, such as the
PTO’s invalidation of a patent?  Under the law of the case doctrine, a deci-
sion on a particular issue should be followed in all subsequent proceedings in
the same case unless “exceptional circumstances” exist.336  For instance, if a
prior decision “was clearly erroneous” and to adhere to it “would work a man-
ifest injustice,” reconsideration of that decision may be warranted.337  The
decision to depart from the law of the case is a matter of discretion,338 and as
long as a case remains pending, the court has the power to alter its earlier
rulings.339
Law of the case is a common law doctrine.  It is most akin to stare deci-
sis,340 but instead of ensuring decisional consistency from one case to
another, law of the case ensures decisional consistency within a particular
335 This argument is also consistent with the frequent complaint that the Federal Cir-
cuit too eagerly embraces bright-line rules and resists context-sensitive standards that
would require the court to engage in policy analysis.  Leading explorations of that critique
include Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1671 (2003); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment in Spe-
cialization, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 772 (2004); Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy,
Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1620–21 (2007); Arti
K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1103–04 (2003); and John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit,
52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 774 (2003).
336 W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (quoting
Cent. Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
337 White v. Murtha, 377 F.2d 428, 431–32 (5th Cir. 1967); accord Ormco Corp. v. Align
Tech., Inc., 498 F.3d 1307, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
338 Higgins v. Cal. Prune & Apricot Grower, Inc., 3 F.2d 896, 898 (2d Cir. 1924) (Hand,
J., sitting by designation) (“‘[L]aw of the case’ does not rigidly bind a court to its former
decisions, but is only addressed to its good sense.”).
339 See 18B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 4478.
340 See Allan D. Vestal, Law of the Case: Single-Suit Preclusion, 1967 UTAH L. REV. 1, 2.
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case.  Under both doctrines, a prior decision is persuasive but not necessarily
binding on the court that rendered it.341  Under law of the case doctrine, a
court is justified in reconsidering its prior decision if the relevant law or facts
have changed since the prior decision.342  Thus, law of the case doctrine, if it
were applied in the case of parallel court and PTO proceedings, would
plainly offer the court discretion to depart from a prior ruling rejecting a
challenge to patent validity when, since that prior decision, the PTO has
issued a ruling of invalidity—a critically important change in circumstances.
Remarkably, several cases the Federal Circuit has cited in developing its
absolute finality rule support the idea of resolving conflicts between the
courts and the PTO via law of the case doctrine. Luminous Unit Co. v. Free-
man-Sweet Co., a Seventh Circuit case cited in Fresenius, provides one exam-
ple.343  In that case, the trial court found a patent to be infringed and
rejected the infringer’s argument that the patent was invalid.344  The Seventh
Circuit affirmed on the issues of validity and infringement and remanded for
an accounting of damages.345  Meanwhile, the patent holder had surren-
dered the infringed patent to the PTO and obtained a reissue patent.346
When the trial court learned of the surrender, it vacated its prior decision on
validity, refusing to be bound by that decision as the law of the case.347  The
Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that law of the case is “not an inexorable
rule, and should not be applied where the law as announced is clearly erro-
neous, and establishes a practice which is contrary to the best interests of
society, and works a manifest injustice.”348  The court noted that when the
plaintiff surrendered the patent it “lost its right to prosecute its pending suit
to final decree” and that, despite the prior ruling in favor of the patent
holder on the issue of validity, “it became the duty of the court to dismiss the
suit.”349
Likewise, in Mendenhall, the Federal Circuit preclusion case that was cen-
tral to the court’s adoption of the absolute finality rule in Fresenius, the court
addressed an alternative argument grounded in law of the case.  Specifically,
the patent holder argued that the Federal Circuit’s previous ruling rejecting
the validity challenge was the law of the case and therefore immune from
reconsideration despite the subsequent ruling of invalidity in another
case.350  But the Federal Circuit disagreed, noting that the subsequent ruling
341 See id.
342 Dow Chem. Corp. v. Nova Chems. Corp., 803 F.3d 620, 628 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
343 3 F.2d 577, 577 (7th Cir. 1924), cited in Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721
F.3d 1330, 1344 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
344 Id.
345 Freeman-Sweet Co v. Luminous Unit Co., 264 F. 107, 110 (7th Cir. 1920).
346 Luminous, 3 F.2d at 579.
347 Id. at 577.
348 Id. at 580.
349 Id.
350 Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 26 F.3d 1573, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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of invalidity qualified as “an exceptional circumstance” warranting reconsid-
eration of its earlier ruling rejecting a validity challenge.351
Although the Federal Circuit has not relied on the law of the case doc-
trine in its recent decisions involving conflicting rulings between a court and
the PTO, it is possible to recast the absolute finality rule in law of the case
terms.  Specifically, the Federal Circuit’s opinions in cases such as Fresenius
could be read as holding that a PTO decision of invalidity is always an excep-
tional circumstance that warrants overturning a prior court decision rejecting
a validity challenge in a pending case.  Yet the law of the case doctrine is
directed toward the court’s sound discretion and encourages the court to
consider whether departing from a prior ruling would be fair or efficient.352
These discretionary, policy-type considerations are wholly absent from the
Federal Circuit’s recent opinions.  If the court were to ground its analysis in
the law of the case, rather than relying on arguably inapposite caselaw, it
would be forced to engage those considerations, and an alternative to the
absolute finality rule might emerge.
C. Applying the Law of the Case Doctrine
It is, to be sure, not an easy task to resolve cases involving conflicting
decisions on patent validity through the policy concerns embedded in law of
the case doctrine.  On one hand, it is reasonable to suggest that accused
infringers should be allowed to invoke PTO decisions of invalidity at practi-
cally any point in the case to protect them from paying damages on a now-
invalidated patent.353  That said, the absolute finality rule can give accused
infringers two chances to prove invalidity, which might be viewed as unfair
and wasteful.354  Indeed, it is not a stretch to say that Fresenius was gaming
the system—it sought reexamination only after an adverse court ruling on
summary judgment.355  Given that gamesmanship, it would be reasonable to
conclude that Fresenius should not have received the benefit of the PTO’s
351 Id.
352 See Joan Steinman, Law of the Case: A Judicial Puzzle in Consolidated and Transferred
Cases and in Multidistrict Litigation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 599 (1987) (“Law of the case
principles are . . . best understood as rules of sensible and sound practice that permit
logical progression toward judgment, but that do not disable a court from altering prior
interlocutory decisions in a case.”).
353 See ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 790 F.3d 1307, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Dyk,
J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (“[I]t would be ‘manifestly unjust’ to allow
[the patent holder] to recover from its invalid patent ‘when the rest of the industry is not
impeded by the patents.’” (quoting Mendenhall, 26 F.3d at 1583)); see also Ilardi, supra note
151, at 2235 (“Most people would likely agree that the . . . outcome in [Fresenius] was
correct—collecting damages on a patent that turns out to be invalid seems at odds with
fundamental concepts of fairness . . . .”).
354 See ePlus, 790 F.3d at 1315 (Moore, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
355 See Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., No. 03-1431, 2007 WL
1655625, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2007) (noting that the district court had denied
Fresenius’s motions for summary judgment of invalidity and granted Baxter’s motion for
partial summary judgment of validity).
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decision of invalidity.  Indeed, a common critique of bright-line rules, such as
the Federal Circuit’s absolute finality rule, is that they can be manipulated,
particularly by sophisticated actors, as litigants in high-stakes patent disputes
tend to be.356
That said, those who think the PTO issues too many “bad” patents (that
is, patents on inventions that represent only marginal improvements in the
state of the art)357 might have no problem with allowing patent challengers
multiple chances to prove invalidity.  But from a procedural perspective,
allowing a party to twice litigate a single issue is unusual.  In Blonder-Tongue,
for example, the Supreme Court eliminated the requirement of mutuality as
a prerequisite to preclusion because it was untenable “to afford a litigant
more than one full and fair opportunity for judicial resolution of the same
issue.”358  And in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore the Court approved of non-
mutual offensive issue preclusion precisely because the defendants had
“received a ‘full and fair’ opportunity to litigate their claims” in an earlier
case.359
In an attempt to find some direction through these competing consider-
ations, it is worth noting a seminal observation by Brainerd Currie.  “[T]he
first lesson one must learn on the subject of res judicata,” he wrote, “is that
judicial findings must not be confused with absolute truth.”360  On that view,
a PTO ruling of invalidity that follows a court ruling rejecting a validity chal-
lenge does not necessarily indicate that the court was wrong, nor does it
prove that the asserted patent is definitely invalid in some ontological sense.
Because courts construe patent claims more narrowly than the PTO and pre-
sume patents to be valid, it is harder to invalidate a patent in court than it is
at the PTO.  More than anything else, then, inconsistent court and PTO deci-
sions: (a) reflect these different legal regimes and (b) suggest that reasonable
minds can differ about the patent’s validity—a fact that is not surprising in
disputes that the parties view as sufficiently important to pursue through two
separate decisions by two different adjudicative bodies.
If a patent’s validity is inherently uncertain, allowing an accused
infringer multiple opportunities to invalidate it risks giving the proceedings
356 See, e.g., Donald T. Hornstein, Resiliency, Adaptation, and the Upsides of Ex Post Law-
making, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1549, 1575–77 (2011); David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law,
66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860, 860 (1999).
357 See generally CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT
RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 61 (2012) (summarizing criti-
ques of the modern patent system).
358 Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 328 (1971).
359 439 U.S. 322, 332–33 (1979).
360 Brainerd Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9
STAN. L. REV. 281, 315 (1957).  For a similar observation in the context of law of the case,
see James Wm. Moore & Robert Stephen Oglebay, The Supreme Court, Stare Decisis and Law
of the Case, 21 TEX. L. REV. 514, 553 (1943) (“Practical results, rather than academic ped-
antry, are needed [in assessing law of the case].  And it should always be borne in mind
that those ends necessitate a termination of litigation within a reasonable time, rather than
the inconclusive striving for some theoretical ideal.”).
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“the aura of [a] gaming table,” which the Supreme Court scorned in Blonder-
Tongue.361  The Court acknowledged that “neither judges, the parties, nor
the adversary system performs perfectly in all cases,” and that, accordingly,
“the requirement of determining whether the party against whom an estop-
pel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate is a most significant
safeguard.”362
The seeming impossibility of determining, with absolute certainty,
whether an invention satisfies the requirements of the Patent Act supports a
principle—contrary to the Federal Circuit’s current doctrine—that limits
accused infringers to one shot at proving invalidity.  But articulating a rule to
implement that principle is surprisingly difficult.  The primary option availa-
ble to the Federal Circuit (or the Supreme Court, should it decide to over-
turn the Federal Circuit’s caselaw) would be to adopt the view of Judges
Newman and O’Malley that court proceedings are immune from the effects
of PTO review once the court has reached a decision on validity that would
be entitled to preclusive effect in another court.363
Yet that approach has its own problems.  Most notably, because it would
render court decisions final at an earlier stage, it would provide less of an
incentive to stay litigation, likely resulting in more frequent conflicts between
the courts and the PTO.  In addition, by allowing a court decision on validity
to short-circuit PTO proceedings, it would thwart Congress’s explicit deci-
sion—embodied most recently in the AIA—to offer infringers two arenas for
challenging validity (the courts and the PTO).
The reality is that, as long as both the courts and the PTO possess inde-
pendent power to invalidate a single patent, conflicting decisions will occur.
No rule of finality adopted by the Federal Circuit will eliminate those con-
flicts, it will only change which of the decisions take precedence.  Congress
could, of course, reduce or eliminate conflicting decisions by making various
changes to the parallel proceedings, and those legislative possibilities are
considered below.364  For now, the most effective option for reducing con-
361 402 U.S. at 329.
362 Id.
363 See supra subsection III.B.2.
364 The Federal Circuit or the Supreme Court, it should be noted, could also reduce
the possibility of conflicting decisions by making various changes to judge-made doctrines
of stare decisis and administrative law, but those changes offer partial solutions at best.
The courts could, for instance, require the PTO to defer as a matter of stare decisis to the
Federal Circuit’s prior decisions on purely legal issues relevant to the determination of
patent validity, such as the ultimate conclusion on obviousness. See Janicke, supra note
151, at 61; see also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007) (“The ultimate
judgment of obviousness is a legal determination.”).  That proposal makes sense when
there is an identical record of prior art before the court and the PTO.  In that situation,
both tribunals are deciding the exact same legal question. See generally Stevenson v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 713 F.2d 705, 711 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting that, in sequential suits for
patent infringement, “[t]he weight given a prior holding of ‘validity’ will vary depending
on the additional prior art or other evidence on patentability that is produced in the subse-
quent suit” and that “[i]f . . . the record in the second suit is substantively identical to the
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flicts is for courts to judiciously use their power to stay litigation in light of
post-issuance proceedings at the PTO.365  The absolute finality rule, for all its
shortcomings, provides a strong incentive for district courts to stay litigation
because their decisions do not become “final” until every single remedial
issue is resolved.  Indeed, Fresenius is commonly cited by district courts as a
reason to justify staying an infringement case.366  And, as noted, district
courts now grant about eighty percent of requests to stay litigation pending
instituted inter partes review.367  Thus, despite its flaws, the absolute finality
rule might be the best option under current law for mediating conflicting
decisions between the courts and the PTO.
IV. THE FUTURE OF ABSOLUTE FINALITY
Although the courts have limited options for adapting to parallel
regimes for reviewing patent validity, Congress has more wide-ranging power
to harmonize proceedings in court and at the PTO.
record produced in the first suit, then it is extremely likely that the court will give its prior
holding stare decisis effect”).  Moreover, any differences in the standards of proof between
the courts and the PTO should be irrelevant when the tribunals are resolving a pure ques-
tion of law. See Janicke, supra note 151, at 58 (citing Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., 131 S. Ct.
2238, 2253 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring)).  However, in cases that end in conflicting
decisions, such as Fresenius, the record before the court and the PTO often differs, see In re
Baxter Int’l, Inc., 678 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (affirming the PTO’s invalidity
decision in reexamination even though the Federal Circuit had previously rejected a valid-
ity challenge, noting that “the examiner based [the] rejections on prior art references that
were not squarely at issue during the trial on the invalidity issues”), which weakens the case
for PTO deference to a prior court ruling as a matter of stare decisis.
Alternatively, the courts could invoke principles of administrative law to defer to the
PTO’s resolution of the issue of patent validity.  As a general matter, deference to the
agency would be appropriate if the PTO were given substantive rulemaking authority,
which it does not currently have. See Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1747, 1751 (2011).  Even in the absence of substantive rulemaking authority, some
commentators have argued that court deference to the PTO is still appropriate due to the
America Invents Act’s creation of relatively formal adjudication proceedings, such as inter
partes review and post-grant review. See, e.g., Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of
Patent Law: Chevron Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 1966–67 (2013).
But even if court deference to the PTO is appropriate as a general matter, that does not
necessarily resolve the issue that is the focus of this Article: What happens if, at the time the
PTO enters a decision of patent invalidity, a court has already resolved the issue of validity
in the patent holder’s favor?
365 See generally Sherkow, supra note 21, at 267–68 (“District courts should . . . take a
nuanced, case-by-case approach to determining whether to grant litigants’ request for stays
pending the outcome of [PTO] proceedings . . . .”).
366 See, e.g., PersonalWeb Techs., LLC v. Apple Inc., 69 F. Supp. 3d 1022, 1025 (N.D.
Cal. 2014).
367 See Love & Ambwani supra note 6, at 103.
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A. Court-PTO Conflicts After the America Invents Act
Some participants in the patent system have argued that Congress has, in
fact, already addressed the issue of conflicting decisions between the courts
and the PTO and that, accordingly, the absolute finality rule will not matter
in the future.368  The most notable way in which the AIA helps avoid conflict
is by requiring the post-issuance proceedings it created (inter partes review,
post-grant review, and covered business method review) to conclude, in most
cases, within one year of the PTAB’s decision to institute.369  Because district
court patent cases usually do not conclude that quickly (unless the parties
settle), the PTO will often finish its post-issuance review before the court pro-
ceedings are complete, even if the court proceedings are not stayed.370
But the one-year time limit on PTO review does not eliminate all possi-
bility of conflict.  To begin with, a defendant in patent infringement litiga-
tion can wait as long as a year after the complaint is filed to petition for inter
partes review,371 and a petition for covered business method review can be
filed almost any time after the complaint is filed.372  Likewise, a petitioner in
inter partes review who is not a defendant in infringement litigation can also
file its petition at any time.373  Further extending the timeline, the patent
368 See, e.g., Respondents’ Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
29–30, Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. Fresenius USA, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2295 (2014) (No. 13-1071) [here-
inafter Fresenius BIO]; Craig E. Countryman, 2015 Patent Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 65
AM. U. L. REV. 769, 903–04 (2016).
369 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(a)(11), 326(a)(11) (2012); 37 C.F.R. § 42.300(c) (2015).
370 On average, inter partes review proceedings take about fifteen months, from the
filing of the petition until the PTO’s final disposition.  Love & Ambwani, supra note 6, at
99.  Patent cases in federal district courts take, on average, approximately one year to
resolve, but that figure is skewed downward by the large number of cases that settle early
on. See Mark A. Lemley, Where to File Your Patent Case, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 401, 415, 418 (2010);
see also Vishnubhakat et al., supra note 6, at 70 (reporting that, from September 2012
through June 2015, seventy percent of patent cases filed in the district courts were likely
settled and that three-quarters of those likely settlements occurred within 9.9 months of
case filing).  For cases that go to trial, the time from filing to trial varies greatly among the
districts. See Lemley, supra, at 416 (reporting a time to trial of less than one year in the
quickest districts, the Western District of Wisconsin and the Eastern District of Virginia, but
a time to trial of over two years in the district with the largest number of patent cases, the
Eastern District of Texas).
371 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).
372 The only timing requirement is that the window for post-grant review must be
closed.  37 C.F.R. § 42.303.  That usually occurs nine months after the patent issues. See
supra note 72.
373 A common scenario in which a non-defendant petitions for inter partes review is
when a patent holder has sued the petitioner’s customers for using allegedly infringing
technology manufactured by the petitioner. See Brian J. Love, Inter Partes Review as a Shield
for Technology Purchasers: A Response to Gaia Bernstein’s The Rise of the End-User in Patent
Litigation, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1075, 1088 (2015) (reporting that roughly fourteen percent of
inter partes review petitions filed in the first eighteen months of the proceeding’s exis-
tence were filed by manufacturers with at least one customer facing a lawsuit, but also
noting that only one-quarter of those petitions “were filed by manufacturers who had not
also been sued themselves”).  Other non-defendants who have filed inter partes review
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holder has three months to respond to the petition,374 and the PTAB will not
act on a petition until it receives that response.375  In addition, the PTAB can
for good cause extend the one-year time limit for conducting the review.376
Finally, as discussed above, PTO proceedings probably are not sufficiently
final to justify abrogating a district court decision at least until the Federal
Circuit affirms the PTO’s invalidity decision, which can take the better part of
an additional year.377  Thus, in some cases, post-issuance proceedings will
conclude two or three years after an infringement complaint is filed, which is
plenty of time for a court to issue a conflicting decision on patent validity,
particularly in judicial districts that process patent cases relatively quickly.378
Likewise, contrary to some suggestions,379 the AIA’s estoppel provisions
will not prevent conflicting decisions between the courts and the PTO.  As
discussed above, those provisions prevent accused infringers from pursuing
arguments in court that they have already pursued or, in some cases, could
petitions include industry groups, public interest organizations, and membership-based
patent risk management firms such as RPX and Unified Patents. See id. at 1094 n.59.
374 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.107(b), 42.207(b), 42.300(a).
375 35 U.S.C. §§ 313, 323.  Under the statute, the PTAB, after receiving the patent
owner’s response, has three months to decide whether the institute review. Id. §§ 314(b),
324(c).
376 Id. §§ 316(a)(11), 326(a)(11); 37 C.F.R. § 42.300(c).
377 See U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Median Time to Disposition in Cases
Terminated After Hearing or Submission, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Me
dian%20Disposition%20Time%20for%20Cases%20Terminated%20after%20Hearing%20
or%20Submission%20%28Detailed%20table%20of%20data%202006-2015%29.pdf (last
visited Sept. 12, 2016); see also WesternGeco LLC v. Ion Geophysical Corp., No. 4:09-CV-
1827 (S.D. Tex. May 4, 2016) (suggesting that PTO proceedings are not final until all
possible routes of appellate review—including certiorari from the Supreme Court—are
exhausted).
378 For instance, in Ultratec, Inc. v. Sorenson Communications, Inc., No. 13-CV-346, 2015
WL 2248437, at *2 (W.D. Wis. May 13, 2015), appeal dismissed sub nom. Ultratec, Inc. v.
CaptionCall, LLC, 611 F. App’x 720 (Fed. Cir. 2015), a jury returned a verdict in the patent
holder’s favor nearly five months before the PTAB invalidated several of the asserted pat-
ent claims in inter partes review.  Likewise, in Paice LLC v. Hyundai Motor Co., No. 12-CV-
499-MJG (D. Md. Oct. 7, 2015), the jury returned a verdict in favor of the patent holder
roughly two months before the PTAB invalidated several of the asserted patent claims,
Ford Motor Co. v. Paice LLC, No. IPR2014-00904, 2015 WL 8536745 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 10,
2015); Ford Motor Co. v. Paice LLC, No. IPR2014-00875, 2015 WL 7695188, at *15
(P.T.A.B. Nov. 23, 2015).  Also, in WesternGeco, No. 4:09-CV-1827, at 4–5, the Federal Cir-
cuit affirmed a jury verdict of infringement one month before the PTAB issued a decision
finding several of the asserted patents to be invalid.  In Personal Audio, LLC v. CBS Corp.,
No. 2:13-cv-270-JRG-RSP (E.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 2014), a jury entered a verdict of infringe-
ment even though the PTAB had a few months earlier invalidated the asserted claims, Elec.
Frontier Found. v. Personal Audio, LLC, No. IPR2014-00070, 2014 WL 8584938, at *15
(P.T.A.B. Apr. 10, 2014).  Finally, in VirnetX Inc. v. Apple Inc., the PTO invalidated several
asserted patent claims shortly after a jury verdict of infringement. See Apple’s Renewed
Motion to Stay at 3–5, VirnetX Inc. v. Apple Inc. (E.D. Tex. July 25, 2016) (No. 6:12-CV-
855-RWS); see also VirnetX Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 6:12-CV-855, slip op. at 1 (E.D. Tex. July
29, 2016) (vacating the jury verdict on other grounds).
379 See Fresenius BIO, supra note 368, at 30.
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have pursued, before the PTAB.380  But the estoppel provisions are irrelevant
if, as commonly occurs in cases that result in conflicting decisions, the
accused infringer loses first in court and wins later at the PTAB.  Under the
AIA, a loss in court has no estoppel effect at the PTAB.
Finally, but perhaps most importantly, the AIA leaves unaffected ex
parte reexamination, which was the PTO proceeding at issue in Fresenius and
ePlus.  Ex parte reexamination remains available after the AIA and, thanks in
part to the absolute finality rule, it will likely remain an attractive option for
at least some accused infringers.381  Unlike inter partes review, which an
accused infringer must seek within a year of being sued for infringement, ex
parte reexamination can be requested at any time.382  And there are no statu-
tory estoppel provisions.  Ex parte reexamination thus allows an accused
infringer to adopt a wait-and-see approach toward litigation: if the accused
infringer proves invalidity in litigation, there is no need for review by the
PTO; if litigation is not going well, the accused infringer can request ex parte
reexamination.  That is the strategy Fresenius employed in its litigation with
Baxter.  And the Federal Circuit’s holding in that case ensures that so long as
the accused infringer can string out the litigation for a sufficiently long time,
the infringer will be able to invoke any favorable decision by the PTO.
To be sure, most cases involving parallel proceedings in court and at the
PTO will not result in conflicting decisions on patent validity.  Litigation is
often stayed, or PTO proceedings conclude before any court ruling on valid-
ity, or the parties simply settle.  And, despite the opportunity for gamesman-
ship presented by ex parte reexamination, many accused infringers will
choose inter partes review because it allows them to participate in the pro-
ceedings and it is more likely than ex parte reexamination to invalidate the
patent.  Still, because ex parte reexamination remains available, and because
post-issuance proceedings under the AIA will not always conclude before dis-
trict court litigation, the problem of conflicting court and PTO decisions will
likely continue to arise in future disputes.
B. Legislative Solutions
The question remains whether there is any way to eliminate conflicting
decisions between the courts and the PTO without causing undue harm to
the patent system.  The surest way to eliminate conflicting decisions would be
to force litigants into a single forum.  That reform has already been partly
realized through frequent judicial stays of litigation pending post-issuance
review.  But because courts do not invariably grant stay motions, the courts
380 See supra Section I.B.
381 In 2014, the PTO received 343 requests for ex parte reexamination, which is down
from a pre-AIA high of 787 in 2012. EX PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA, supra note 53,
at 1.  On the continued attractiveness of ex parte reexamination even after the AIA, see
generally Chris Rourk & Blake Dietrich, Ex Parte Re-Exam—An Overlooked Way to Challenge
Patents, LAW360 (Apr. 28, 2016), http://www.law360.com/ip/articles/778917/ex-parte-re-
exam-an-overlooked-way-to-challenge-patents.
382 See 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2012).
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themselves are unlikely to fully eliminate conflicting decisions on patent
validity.
One way in which Congress could force litigants into a single forum
would be to adopt a regime of staged adjudication in which one body, either
the courts or the PTO, would decide all issues within its authority before the
other body is allowed to proceed.383  Given the political winds favoring
expansion of PTO proceedings and the Seventh Amendment guarantee of a
jury trial on the issue of infringement,384 the most plausible model of staged
adjudication would require the parties to first litigate all validity and enforce-
ability issues at the PTO before moving on to court proceedings on infringe-
ment and remedies.385
Assigning all validity issues to the PTO may make sense from the per-
spective of institutional design, for it has expert examiners and administra-
tive patent judges who would seem better equipped than a federal district
judge or a jury to resolve the issue of patent validity.386  The notion of essen-
tially referring questions of validity to the PTO mirrors John Duffy’s proposal
that courts invoke administrative law’s primary jurisdiction doctrine to obtain
authoritative claim constructions from the agency.387  Permitting an
infringer to litigate validity only at the PTO would also save the courts from
conducting proceedings that may prove to have been unnecessary.  The
infringement litigation in Fresenius, for instance, spanned ten years, two jury
trials, and two appeals before the Federal Circuit dismissed the case.  The
infringement litigation in ePlus spanned five years, a jury trial, contempt pro-
ceedings, and two appeals before the Federal Circuit dismissed it.
383 The concept of staged adjudication has recently gained attention in the institutional
design literature. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Multistage Adjudication, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1179,
1223–25 (2013); see also Greg Reilly, Linking Patent Reform and Civil Litigation Reform, 47
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 179, 184 (2015) (suggesting staged litigation to reduce the costs of discov-
ery in patent cases).
384 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 377 (1996).
385 Having the PTO decide validity issues first would make sense because one ruling of
invalidity precludes all future enforcement efforts, as the Supreme Court held in Blonder-
Tongue.  Thus, a ruling of invalidity is more valuable to the public than a ruling of nonin-
fringement, which would not preclude a future suit against a different defendant. See
Megan M. La Belle, Against Settlement of (Some) Patent Cases, 67 VAND. L. REV. 375, 397–401
(2014).  For a proposal that the issues of validity and infringement be staged within district
court litigation to reduce accused infringers’ incentives to argue for noninfringement
rather than invalidity, see Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99 COR-
NELL L. REV. 71, 119 (2013).
386 See Arjun Rangarajan, Note, Towards a More Uniform Procedure for Patent Invalidation,
95 J. PAT. & TRADMARK OFF. SOC’Y 375, 384 (2013); Amy J. Tindell, Note, Final Adjudication
of Patent Validity in PTO Reexamination and Article III Courts: Whose Job Is It Anyway?, 89 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 787, 801 (2007).
387 John F. Duffy, On Improving the Legal Process of Claim Interpretation: Administrative Alter-
natives, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 109, 145–48 (2000); see also Ilardi, supra note 151, at 2242
(proposing, as a mechanism to avoid conflicting court and PTO decisions on patent valid-
ity, to use the primary jurisdiction doctrine to mandate that courts refer certain validity
issues to the PTO).
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Shifting validity proceedings entirely to the PTO, however, would be a
drastic change, as courts have had the power to issue validity rulings since
Congress passed the very first Patent Act in 1790.388  Staging adjudication of
patent cases would also impose costs on patent owners and the public.  For
patent owners, staging would delay enforcement of the patent and grant the
accused infringer additional leverage in negotiating a settlement on
favorable terms.  For the public, shifting validity proceedings entirely to the
PTO would likely require an increase in the PTO’s resources, most notably
the hiring of additional administrative patent judges.389  The PTO has
already grown substantially in recent years, and this bureaucratic expansion
may not be sustainable.390
In short, there are reasonable arguments both in favor of shifting all
validity proceedings to the PTO and in favor of the status quo, in which the
PTO has the ability to decide some (but not all) issues of validity and in
which the courts often (but not always) stay litigation pending PTO review.
The elimination of conflicting decisions might be one additional considera-
tion in favor of shifting validity proceedings to the PTO but because conflict-
ing decisions occur in only a subset of cases, that consideration should
probably not be dispositive on this complex question of institutional design.
There are, however, more modest reforms that could help reduce the
frequency of conflicting decisions between the courts and the PTO without
fundamentally transforming the patent system.  To begin with, one possibil-
ity, short of assigning all validity issues to the PTO, would be for Congress to
make clear that, absent exceptional circumstances, court litigation should be
stayed pending PTO review.  The AIA essentially dictates this result when the
PTAB is conducting covered business method review.391  Congress could
extend that approach to other PTO proceedings, including inter partes
review and perhaps even ex parte reexamination, particularly if the reexami-
nation was requested by the defendant in the litigation.  The benefit of apply-
ing to all PTO proceedings the stay approach of the covered business method
statute, as opposed to a rule mandating staged adjudication, is that it would
allow district courts to deny a stay when it would clearly harm the patent
holder—for example, if the PTO instituted review of only a fraction of the
patent claims asserted in the litigation; if the defendant did not file its peti-
388 Act of April 10, 1790, §§ 5–6, 1 Stat. 109, 111–12.  Shifting validity proceedings
entirely to the PTO would also require Congress to eliminate the authority of the Interna-
tional Trade Commission to rule on patent validity, which seems unlikely to occur. See
Thomas F. Cotter, The International Trade Commission: Reform or Abolition? A Comment on
Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98
CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 43, 53 (2013); see also supra notes 33, 43 (discussing the ITC’s
authority over patent disputes).
389 The PTO currently employs about 250 PTAB judges. See Ryan Davis, Departing
PTAB Chief Judge Hailed for Smooth AIA Launch, LAW360 (May 19, 2015), http://www.law360
.com/articles/657843.
390 See John M. Golden, Proliferating Patents and Patent Law’s “Cost Disease”, 51 HOUS. L.
REV. 455, 483 (2013).
391 See supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text.
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tion at an early stage of the litigation (this consideration is particularly rele-
vant when the PTO proceeding is ex parte reexamination, a proceeding for
which there is no deadline for seeking PTO review); or if the parties are
competitors and the patent holder, if victorious, would likely be entitled to
an injunction.392
Congress might focus reform efforts on ex parte reexamination in par-
ticular.  Congress could eliminate the proceeding altogether, but that may be
bad policy.  Ex parte reexamination, because it does not allow the challenger
to participate, can be a cheaper option for those who cannot afford the
adversarial proceedings created by the AIA.  One simple change to ex parte
reexamination Congress should consider is imposing on defendants who are
sued for infringement a time limit for requesting reexamination, similar to
the one-year time limit imposed by the AIA.  A time limit on requesting reex-
amination would restrict an accused infringer’s ability to take a wait-and-see
approach to the litigation, as occurred in Fresenius.  And it would also
increase the chances that the district court would grant a motion to stay,
because that motion would inevitably be filed early in the case.
The aim of reducing conflicting court and PTO decisions also supports
the idea of having the courts and the PTAB apply the same claim construc-
tion standards when reviewing the validity of an issued patent.  The Supreme
Court recently refused to overturn the PTO’s use of the broadest reasonable
interpretation standard, applying Chevron deference,393 but both the House
and the Senate have considered bills that would require the PTAB to apply
the same claim construction standard as the district courts.394  Aligning claim
construction standards would help ensure that PTAB claim constructions
receive preclusive effect in court (and vice versa) and thereby help avoid con-
flicting rulings on validity.  However, because conflicting decisions are often
due to differing factual records and burdens of proof,395 aligning claim con-
struction standards would not eliminate conflict entirely.396
392 See generally VirtualAgility Inc. v. Salesforce.com, Inc., 759 F.3d 1307, 1314, 1317–20
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (discussing several considerations relevant to the decision of whether to
stay litigation pending covered business method review).
393 Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142–43 (2016).
394 Protecting American Talent and Entrepreneurship (PATENT) Act of 2015, S. 1137,
114th Cong. § 14(b)(a)–(b); Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. § 9(b) (2015).
395 See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
396 For an example of conflicting decisions that might have been avoided if the courts
and the PTO applied the same claim construction standards, see Intellectual Ventures I, LLC
v. Canon Inc., 143 F. Supp. 3d 143, 184 n.54 (D. Del. 2015) (denying a stay pending post-
issuance review and noting that, although the PTAB had found one of the asserted patents
to be invalid, the court had construed a key claim term “in a contrary manner to the
construction assigned by the PTAB”).  For a recent Federal Circuit opinion grappling with
the differences between the Phillips claim construction standard applied by the courts and
the PTO’s broadest reasonable interpretation standard, see PPC Broadband, Inc. v. Corn-
ing Optical Commc’ns RF, LLC, 815 F.3d 747, 756 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“If we were tasked
with reviewing the Board’s construction according to Phillips . . . , this case would be
straight-forward.  [The appellant’s suggested claim] construction is the only construc-
tion . . . consistent with . . . the specification.  But this case is much closer under the
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Congress could further increase consistency between district court litiga-
tion and post-issuance review at the PTO by requiring both tribunals to apply
the same burden of proof on the question of patent validity.  For instance,
one proposal pending in Congress would require the PTO to apply the clear
and convincing evidence standard that applies in court litigation over valid-
ity.397  That proposal, however, is hard to justify as a matter of institutional
design.  The clear and convincing standard that applies in litigation is a form
of judicial deference to agency decision-making.398  But it makes little sense
to say that a three-judge panel of the PTAB conducting inter partes review
should defer to a prior decision by a single examiner to issue the patent.399
Another option for aligning the burdens of proof would be to eliminate
the presumption of validity altogether and have both the courts and the PTO
apply a preponderance standard.  That reform would almost certainly have to
come from Congress, not the courts, for the Supreme Court in 2011 squarely
held that, under the current version of the Patent Act, a challenger must
prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence.400  In any event, it may be
too drastic to lower the burden of proof in all patent cases merely to solve the
episodic problem of conflicting court and PTO rulings on validity.  A thor-
ough analysis of any proposal to eliminate the presumption of validity would
also need to engage broad considerations about the state of the patent system
that are beyond this Article’s scope.  For instance, if it is true that the PTO
issues too many bad patents, then the clear and convincing evidence stan-
dard may unduly insulate those patents from invalidity challenges, and there
is a strong argument for repealing it.401  (Indeed, the decision to issue a
patent, made by a single examiner with limited time to allocate to the task402
may not be the type of reasoned decision-making to which court deference is
appropriate.403)  By contrast, if one is skeptical about the ability of a lay
broadest reasonable interpretation standard . . . .”).  For a scholarly argument in favor of
aligning claim construction standards, see Dreyfuss, supra note 21, at 289 (arguing that
“[a]llowing patent holders to rely on prior PTAB claim constructions in enforcement
actions would streamline litigation and provide winning patent holders with a degree of
repose”).
397 Support Technology and Research for Our Nation’s Growth (STRONG) Patents Act
of 2015, S. 632, 114th Cong. §§ 102–03 (2015).
398 Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent System
Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 281–82 (2007).
399 In any case, the pending bill, which proposes many other controversial reforms to
the patent system, is backed by several Democratic senators and is therefore unlikely to
gain traction in the current Congress.
400 Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91 (2011).
401 See Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity,
60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 48 (2007).
402 See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495,
1499–1500 (2001).
403 Cf. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (“The weight [accorded
to an administrative] judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness
evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and
later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking
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judge or jury to better evaluate patent validity than the supposedly expert
examiners at the PTO, then the clear and convincing standard probably
makes sense,404 even if it facilitates occasional conflicts between the courts
and the PTO.
CONCLUSION
As long as both the courts and the PTO are allowed to decide the validity
of the same patent, inconsistent decisions will occur and the problem of
Schro¨dinger patents—patents that appear to be both valid and invalid—will
persist.  Both the Federal Circuit and Congress have, to date, mostly ignored
this reality.  The Federal Circuit has adopted a bright-line, absolute finality
rule that disregards the difficult practical and policy questions that conflict-
ing decisions implicate.  Congress, for its part, has consistently expanded
post-issuance review at the PTO by emphasizing the speed and efficiency of
administrative adjudication405 while ignoring the complications of having
two different forums review the validity of a single patent.
Because Congress has the ultimate authority to create and abolish these
parallel regimes, the courts can only adapt.  Under current law, the most
effective way for courts to avoid conflict with the PTO is to stay litigation,
although that is not the optimal solution in every case.  As Congress consid-
ers further changes to the law of patent enforcement,406 the issue of how to
better coordinate patent validity disputes should be a central concern.
power to control.” (alteration in original) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134,
140 (1944)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
404 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 28,
Microsoft, 564 U.S. 91 (No. 10-290).
405 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 40 (2011).
406 See generally Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Litigation Reform: The Courts, Congress, and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 279, 283–87 (2015) (discussing recent legisla-
tive proposals to reform patent litigation).
